Measuring the Impact of Wimbledon’s Seeding Formula

Unlike every other tournament on the tennis calendar, Wimbledon uses its own formula to determine seedings. The grass court Grand Slam grants seeds to the top 32 players in each tour’s rankings, and then re-orders them based on its own algorithm, which rewards players for their performance on grass over the last two seasons.

This year, the Wimbledon seeding formula has more impact on the men’s draw than usual. Seven-time champion Roger Federer is one of the best grass court players of all time, and though he dominated hard courts in the first half of 2017, he still sits outside the top four in the ATP rankings after missing the second half of 2016. Thanks to Wimbledon’s re-ordering of the seeds, Federer will switch places with ATP No. 3 Stan Wawrinka and take his place in the draw as the third seed.

Even with Wawrinka’s futility on grass and the shakiness of Andy Murray and Novak Djokovic, getting inside the top four has its benefits. If everyone lives up to their seed in the first four rounds (they won’t, but bear with me), the No. 5 seed will face a path to the title that requires beating three top-four players. Whichever top-four guy has No. 5 in his quarter would confront the same challenge, but the other three would have an easier time of it. Before players are placed in the draw, top-four seeds have a 75% chance of that easier path.

Let’s attach some numbers to these speculations. I’m interested in the draw implications of three different seeding methods: ATP rankings (as every other tournament uses), the Wimbledon method, and weighted grass-court Elo. As I described last week, weighted surface-specific Elo–averaging surface-specific Elo with overall Elo–is more predictive than ATP rankings, pure surface Elo, or overall Elo. What’s more, weighted grass-court Elo–let’s call it gElo–is about as predictive as its peers for hard and clay courts, even though we have less grass-court data to go on. In a tennis world populated only by analysts, seedings would be determined by something a lot more like gElo and a lot less like the ATP computer.

Since gElo ratings provide the best forecasts, we’ll use them to determine the effects of the different seeding formulas. Here is the current gElo top sixteen, through Halle and Queen’s Club:

1   Novak Djokovic         2296.5  
2   Andy Murray            2247.6  
3   Roger Federer          2246.8  
4   Rafael Nadal           2101.4  
5   Juan Martin Del Potro  2037.5  
6   Kei Nishikori          2035.9  
7   Milos Raonic           2029.4  
8   Jo Wilfried Tsonga     2020.2  
9   Alexander Zverev       2010.2  
10  Marin Cilic            1997.7  
11  Nick Kyrgios           1967.7  
12  Tomas Berdych          1967.0  
13  Gilles Muller          1958.2  
14  Richard Gasquet        1953.4  
15  Stanislas Wawrinka     1952.8  
16  Feliciano Lopez        1945.3

We might quibble with some these positions–the algorithm knows nothing about whatever is plaguing Djokovic, for one thing–but in general, gElo does a better job of reflecting surface-specific ability level than other systems.

The forecasts

Next, we build a hypothetical 128-player draw and run a whole bunch of simulations. I’ve used the top 128 in the ATP rankings, except for known withdrawals such as David Goffin and Pablo Carreno Busta, which doesn’t differ much from the list of guys who will ultimately make up the field. Then, for each seeding method, we randomly generate a hundred thousand draws, simulate those brackets, and tally up the winners.

Here are the ATP top ten, along with their chances of winning Wimbledon using the three different seeding methods:

Player              ATP     W%  Wimb     W%  gElo     W%  
Andy Murray           1  23.6%     1  24.3%     2  24.1%  
Rafael Nadal          2   6.1%     4   5.7%     4   5.5%  
Stanislas Wawrinka    3   0.8%     5   0.5%    15   0.4%  
Novak Djokovic        4  34.1%     2  35.4%     1  34.8%  
Roger Federer         5  21.1%     3  22.4%     3  22.4%  
Marin Cilic           6   1.3%     7   1.0%    10   1.0%  
Milos Raonic          7   2.0%     6   1.6%     7   1.7%  
Dominic Thiem         8   0.4%     8   0.3%    17   0.2%  
Kei Nishikori         9   1.9%     9   1.7%     6   1.9%  
Jo Wilfried Tsonga   10   1.6%    12   1.4%     8   1.5%

Again, gElo is probably too optimistic on Djokovic–at least the betting market thinks so–but the point here is the differences between systems. Federer gets a slight bump for entering the top four, and Wawrinka–who gElo really doesn’t like–loses a big chunk of his modest title hopes by falling out of the top four.

The seeding effect is a lot more dramatic if we look at semifinal odds instead of championship odds:

Player              ATP    SF%  Wimb    SF%  gElo    SF%  
Andy Murray           1  58.6%     1  64.1%     2  63.0%  
Rafael Nadal          2  34.4%     4  39.2%     4  38.1%  
Stanislas Wawrinka    3  13.2%     5   7.7%    15   6.1%  
Novak Djokovic        4  66.1%     2  71.1%     1  70.0%  
Roger Federer         5  49.6%     3  64.0%     3  63.2%  
Marin Cilic           6  13.6%     7  11.1%    10  10.3%  
Milos Raonic          7  17.3%     6  14.0%     7  15.2%  
Dominic Thiem         8   7.1%     8   5.4%    17   3.8%  
Kei Nishikori         9  15.5%     9  14.5%     6  15.7%  
Jo Wilfried Tsonga   10  14.0%    12  13.1%     8  14.0%

There’s a lot more movement here for the top players among the different seeding methods. Not only do Federer’s semifinal chances leap from 50% to 64% when he moves inside the top four, even Djokovic and Murray see a benefit because Federer is no longer a possible quarterfinal opponent. Once again, we see the biggest negative effect to Wawrinka: A top-four seed would’ve protected a player who just isn’t likely to get that far on grass.

Surprisingly, the traditional big four are almost the only players out of all 32 seeds to benefit from the Wimbledon algorithm. By removing the chance that Federer would be in, say, Murray’s quarter, the Wimbledon seedings make it a lot less likely that there will be a surprise semifinalist. Tomas Berdych’s semifinal chances improve modestly, from 8.0% to 8.4%, with his Wimbledon seed of No. 11 instead of his ATP ranking of No. 13, but the other 27 seeds have lower chances of reaching the semis than they would have if Wimbledon stopped meddling and used the official rankings.

That’s the unexpected side effect of getting rankings and seedings right: It reduces the chances of deep runs from unexpected sources. It’s similar to the impact of Grand Slams using 32 seeds instead of 16: By protecting the best (and next best, in the case of seeds 17 through 32) from each other, tournaments require that unseeded players work that much harder. Wimbledon’s algorithm took away some serious upset potential when it removed Wawrinka from the top four, but it made it more likely that we’ll see some blockbuster semifinals between the world’s best grass court players.

The Steadily Less Predictable WTA

Update: The numbers in this post summarizing the effectiveness of sElo are much too high–a bug in my code led to calculating effectiveness with post-match ratings instead of pre-match ratings. The parts of the post that don’t have to do with sElo are unaffected and–I hope–remain of interest.

One of the talking points throughout the 2017 WTA season has been the unpredictability of the field. With the absence of Serena Williams, Victoria Azarenka, and until recently, Petra Kvitova and Maria Sharapova, there is a dearth of consistently dominant players. Many of the top remaining players have been unsteady as well, due to some combination of injury (Simona Halep), extreme surface preferences (Johanna Konta), and good old-fashioned regression to the mean (Angelique Kerber).

No top seed has yet won a title at the Premier level or above so far this year. Last week, Stephanie Kovalchik went into more detail, quantifying how seeds have failed to meet expectations and suggesting that the official WTA ranking system–the algorithm that determines which players get those seeds–has failed.

There are plenty of problems with the WTA ranking system, especially if you expect it to have predictive value–that is, if you want it to properly reflect the performance level of players right now. Kovalchik is correct that the rankings have done a particularly poor job this year identifying the best players. However, there’s something else going on: According to much more accurate algorithms, the WTA is more chaotic than it has been for decades.

Picking winners

Let’s start with a really basic measurement: picking winners. Through Rome, there had been more than 1100 completed WTA matches. The higher-ranked player won 62.4% of those. Since 1990, the ranking system has picked the winner of 67.9% of matches, and topped 70% during several years in the 1990s. It never fell below 66% until 2014, and this year’s 62.4% is the worst in the 28-year time frame under consideration.

Elo does a little better. It rates players by the quality of their opponents, meaning that draw luck is taken out of the equation, and does a better job of estimating the ability level of players like Serena and Sharapova, who for various reasons have missed long stretches of time. Since 1990, Elo has picked the winner of 68.6% of matches, falling to an all-time low of 63.1% so far in 2017.

For a big improvement, we need surface-specific Elo (sElo). An effective surface-based system isn’t as complicated as I expected it to be. By generating separate rankings for each surface (using only matches on that surface), sElo has correctly predicted the winner of 76.2% of matches since 1990, almost cracking 80% back in 1992. Even sElo is baffled by 2017, falling to it’s lowest point of 71.0% in 2017.

(sElo for all three major surfaces is now shown on the Tennis Abstract Elo ratings report.)

This graph shows how effectively the three algorithms picked winners. It’s clear that sElo is far better, and the graph also shows that some external factor is driving the predictability of results, affecting the accuracy of all three systems to a similar degree:

Brier scores

We see a similar effect if we use a more sophisticated method to rate the WTA ranking system against Elo and sElo. The Brier score of a collection of predictions measures not only how accurate they are, but also how well calibrated they are–that is, a player forecast to win a matchup 90% of the time really does win nine out of ten, not six out of ten, and vice versa. Brier scores average the square of the difference between each prediction and its corresponding result. Because it uses the square, very bad predictions (for instance, that a player has a 95% chance of winning a match she ended up losing) far outweigh more pedestrian ones (like a player with a 95% chance going on to win).

In 2017 so far, the official WTA ranking system has a Brier score of .237, compared to Elo of .226 and sElo of .187. Lower is better, since we want a system that minimizes the difference between predictions and actual outcomes. All three numbers are the highest of any season since 1990. The corresponding averages over that time span are .207 (WTA), .202 (Elo), and .164 (sElo).

As with the simpler method of counting correct predictions, we see that Elo is a bit better than the official ranking, and both of the surface-agnostic methods are crushed by sElo, even though the surface-specific method uses considerably less data. (For instance, the clay-specific Elo ignores hard and grass court results entirely.) And just like the results of picking winners, we see that the differences in Brier scores of the three methods are fairly consistent, meaning that some other factor is causing the year-to-year differences:

The takeaway

The WTA ranking system has plenty of issues, but its unusually bad performance this year isn’t due to any quirk in the algorithm. Elo and sElo are structured completely differently–the only thing they have in common with the official system is that they use WTA match results–and they show the same trends in both of the above metrics.

One factor affecting the last two years of forecasting accuracy is the absence of players like Serena, Sharapova, and Azarenka. If those three played full schedules and won at their usual clip, there would be quite a few more correct predictions for all three systems, and perhaps there would be fewer big upsets from the players who have tried to replace them at the top of the game.

But that isn’t the whole story. A bunch of no-brainer predictions don’t affect Brier score very much, and the presence of heavily-favored players also make it more likely that massively surprising results occur, such as Serena’s loss to Madison Brengle, or Sharapova’s ouster at the hands of Eugenie Bouchard. Many unexpected results are completely independent of the top ten, like Marketa Vondrousova’s recent title in Biel.

While some of the year-to-year differences in the graphs above are simply noise, the last several years looks much more like a meaningful trend. It could be that we are seeing a large-scale changing of a guard, with young players (and their low rankings) regularly upsetting established stars, while the biggest names in the sport are spending more time on the sidelines. Upsets may also be somewhat contagious: When one 19-year-old aspirant sees a peer beating top-tenners, she may be more confident that she can do the same.

Whatever influences have given us the WTA’s current state of unpredictability, we can see that it’s not just a mirage created by a flawed ranking system. Upsets are more common now than at any other point in recent memory, whichever algorithm you use to pick your favorites.

Playing Even Better Than Number One

Last night in Miami, Venus Williams beat newly re-minted WTA No. 1 Angelique Kerber. Venus, of course, has plenty of experience clashing with the very best in women’s tennis, with 15 Grand Slam finals and three spells at the No. 1 ranking herself.

Last night’s quarterfinal was Venus’s 37th match against a WTA No. 1  and her 15th win. Kerber became the sixth different top-ranked player to lose at the hands of the elder Williams sister.

All of these numbers are very impressive, especially when you consider that, taken as a whole, WTA No. 1s have won just over 88% of their nearly 2,300 matches since the modern ranking system was instituted. However, Venus doesn’t hold the record in any of these categories.

Records against No. 1s are a somewhat odd classification, since the best players tend to reach the top spot themselves. For example, Martina Hingis played only 11 matches against top-ranked opponents, barely one-fifth as many as the leader in that category. On the other hand, injuries and other layoffs have meant that many all-time greats have found themselves lower in the rankings for long stretches. That is particularly true of Venus and Serena Williams.

With her 37 matches played against No. 1s, Venus is approaching the top of the list, but it will take a superhuman effort to catch Arantxa Sanchez Vicario, at 51:

Rank  Player                   Matches vs No. 1
1     Arantxa Sanchez Vicario                51
2     Gabriela Sabatini                      38
3     Venus Williams                         37
4     Lindsay Davenport                      34
5     Conchita Martinez                      33
6     Helena Sukova                          31
7     Serena Williams                        28
8     Svetlana Kuznetsova                    27
-     Jana Novotna                           27
10    Amelie Mauresmo                        25
11    Maria Sharapova                        23

Wins against No. 1s is a more achievable goal. Martina Navratilova holds the current record at 18*, followed by Serena at 16, and then Lindsay Davenport and Venus at 15:

Rank  Player               Wins  Losses
1     Martina Navratilova    18*      
2     Serena Williams        16      12
3     Lindsay Davenport      15      19
-     Venus Williams         15      22
5     Steffi Graf            11       8
6     Gabriela Sabatini      10      28
7     Amelie Mauresmo         8      17
8     Svetlana Kuznetsova     7      20
-     Maria Sharapova         7      16
-     Mary Pierce             7      15
-     Justine Henin           7       9

*My database does not have rankings throughout Navratilova’s entire career, but other sources credit her with 18 wins.

Win percentage against top-ranked opponents is a bit trickier, as it depends where you set the minimum number of matches. I’ve drawn the line at five. That’s rather low, but I wanted to include Alize Cornet and Elina Svitolina, active players who have each won three of their six matches against No. 1s. By this standard, Venus ranks eighth, though equally reasonable thresholds of 8 or 10 matches would move her up two or three places:

Rank  Player             Wins  Losses   Win%
1     Steffi Graf          11       8  57.9%
2     Serena Williams      16      12  57.1%
3     Petra Kvitova         5       4  55.6%
4     Elina Svitolina       3       3  50.0%
-     Alize Cornet          3       3  50.0%
6     Lindsay Davenport    15      19  44.1%
7     Justine Henin         7       9  43.8%
8     Venus Williams       15      22  40.5%
9     Vera Zvonareva        4       7  36.4%
-     Dinara Safina         4       7  36.4%

Remember that the average player wins fewer than 12% of matches against No. 1s!

Finally, Venus’s defeat of Kerber gave her a win against her sixth different No. 1, moving her into second place in that department. As is so often the case, she trails only her sister, who has beaten seven. Oddly enough, there is very little overlap between Serena’s and Venus’s lists: Their only common victims are Hingis and Davenport. The full list:

Rank  Player               No. 1s defeated
1     Serena Williams                    7
2     Venus Williams                     6
3     Steffi Graf                        5
-     Kim Clijsters                      5
-     Amelie Mauresmo                    5
-     Maria Sharapova                    5
7     Petra Kvitova                      4
-     Lindsay Davenport                  4
-     Justine Henin                      4
-     Svetlana Kuznetsova                4

If Karolina Pliskova–who now stands within 1500 points of No. 1 and could further close the gap in Miami–reaches the top spot, Venus may get a chance to beat a 7th top player. Of course, Serena could get that chance, as well.

Measuring the Performance of Tennis Prediction Models

With the recent buzz about Elo rankings in tennis, both at FiveThirtyEight and here at Tennis Abstract, comes the ability to forecast the results of tennis matches. It’s not far fetched to ask yourself, which of these different models perform better and, even more interesting, how they fare compared to other ‘models’, such as the ATP ranking system or betting markets.

For this, admittedly limited, investigation, we collected the (implied) forecasts of five models, that is, FiveThirtyEight, Tennis Abstract, Riles, the official ATP rankings, and the Pinnacle betting market for the US Open 2016. The first three models are based on Elo. For inferring forecasts from the ATP ranking, we use a specific formula1 and for Pinnacle, which is one of the biggest tennis bookmakers, we calculate the implied probabilities based on the provided odds (minus the overround)2.

Next, we simply compare forecasts with reality for each model asking If player A was predicted to be the winner (P(a) > 0.5), did he really win the match? When we do that for each match and each model (ignoring retirements or walkovers) we come up with the following results.

Model		% correct
Pinnacle	76.92%
538		75.21%
TA		74.36%
ATP		72.65%
Riles		70.09%

What we see here is how many percent of the predictions were actually right. The betting model (based on the odds of Pinnacle) comes out on top followed by the Elo models of FiveThirtyEight and Tennis Abstract. Interestingly, the Elo model of Riles is outperformed by the predictions inferred from the ATP ranking. Since there are several parameters that can be used to tweak an Elo model, Riles may still have some room left for improvement.

However, just looking at the percentage of correctly called matches does not tell the whole story. In fact, there are more granular metrics to investigate the performance of a prediction model: Calibration, for instance, captures the ability of a model to provide forecast probabilities that are close to the true probabilities. In other words, in an ideal model, we want 70% forecasts to be true exactly in 70% of the cases. Resolution measures how much the forecasts differ from the overall average. The rationale here is, that just using the expected average values for forecasting will lead to a reasonably well-calibrated set of predictions, however, it will not be as useful as a method that manages the same calibration while taking current circumstances into account. In other words, the more extreme (and still correct) forecasts are, the better.

In the following table we categorize the set of predictions into bins of different probabilities and show how many percent of the predictions were correct per bin. This also enables us to calculate Calibration and Resolution measures for each model.

Model    50-59%  60-69%  70-79%  80-89%  90-100% Cal  Res   Brier
538      53%     61%     85%     80%     91%     .003 .082  .171
TA       56%     75%     78%     74%     90%     .003 .072  .182
Riles    56%     86%     81%     63%     67%     .017 .056  .211
ATP      50%     73%     77%     84%     100%    .003 .068  .185
Pinnacle 52%     91%     71%     77%     95%     .015 .093  .172

As we can see, the predictions are not always perfectly in line with what the corresponding bin would suggest. Some of these deviations, for instance the fact that for the Riles model only 67% of the 90-100% forecasts were correct, can be explained by small sample size (only three in that case). However, there are still two interesting cases (marked in bold) where sample size is better and which raised my interest. Both the Riles and Pinnacle models seem to be strongly underconfident (statistically significant) with their 60-69% predictions. In other words, these probabilities should have been higher, because, in reality, these forecasts were actually true 86% and 91% percent of the times.3 For the betting aficionados, the fact that Pinnacle underestimates the favorites here may be really interesting, because it could reveal some value as punters would say. For the Riles model, this would maybe be a starting point to tweak the model.

In the last three columns Calibration (the lower the better), Resolution (the higher the better), and the Brier score (the lower the better) are shown. The Brier score combines Calibration and Resolution (and the uncertainty of the outcomes) into a single score for measuring the accuracy of predictions. The models of FiveThirtyEight and Pinnacle (for the used subset of data) essentially perform equally good. Then there is a slight gap until the model of Tennis Abstract and the ATP ranking model come in third and fourth, respectively. The Riles model performs worst in terms of both Calibration and Resolution, hence, ranking fifth in this analysis.

To conclude, I would like to show a common visual representation that is used to graphically display a set of predictions. The reliability diagram compares the observed rate of forecasts with the forecast probability (similar to the above table).

The closer one of the colored lines is to the black line, the more reliable the forecasts are. If the forecast lines are above the black line, it means that forecasts are underconfident, in the opposite case, forecasts are overconfident. Given that we only investigated one tournament and therefore had to work with a low sample size (117 predictions), the big swings in the graph are somewhat expected. Still, we can see that the model based on ATP rankings does a really good job in preventing overestimations even though it is known to be outperformed by Elo in terms of prediction accuracy.

To sum up, this analysis shows how different predictive models for tennis can be compared among each other in a meaningful way. Moreover, I hope I could exhibit some of the areas where a model is good and where it’s bad. Obviously, this investigation could go into much more detail by, for example, comparing the models in how well they do for different kinds of players (e.g., based on ranking), different surfaces, etc. This is something I will spare for later. For now, I’ll try to get my sleeping patterns accustomed to the schedule of play for the Australian Open, and I hope, you can do the same.

Peter Wetz is a computer scientist interested in racket sports and data analytics based in Vienna, Austria.


1. P(a) = a^e / (a^e + b^e) where a are player A’s ranking points, b are player B’s ranking points, and e is a constant. We use e = 0.85 for ATP men’s singles.

2. The betting market in itself is not really a model, that is, the goal of the bookmakers is simply to balance their book. This means that the odds, more or less, reflect the wisdom of the crowd, making it a very good predictor.

3. As an example, one instance, where Pinnacle was underconfident and all other models were more confident is the R32 encounter between Ivo Karlovic and Jared Donaldson. Pinnacle’s implied probability for Karlovic to win was 64%. The other models (except the also underconfident Riles model) gave 72% (ATP ranking), 75% (FiveThirtyEight), and 82% (Tennis Abstract). Turns out, Karlovic won in straight sets. One factor at play here might be that these were the US Open where more US citizens are likely to be confident about the US player Jared Donaldson and hence place a bet on him. As a consequence, to balance the book, Pinnacle will lower the odds on Donaldson, which results in higher odds (and a lower implied probability) for Karlovic.

Why Novak Djokovic is Still Number One

Two weeks ago, Andy Murray took over the ATP #1 ranking from Novak Djokovic. Yesterday, he defeated Djokovic in their first meeting since June, securing his place at the top of the year-end ranking table. Murray has been outstanding in the second half of this season, winning all but three of his matches since the Roland Garros final, and he capped the year in style, beating four top-five players to claim the title at the World Tour Finals.

Despite all that, Murray is not the best player in the world. That title still belongs to Djokovic. Since June, Murray has closed the gap, establishing himself as part of what we might call the “Big Two,” but he hasn’t quite ousted his rival. There’s no question that over this period, Murray has played better–that sort of thing is occasionally debatable, but this season it’s just historical fact–but identifying the best player implies something more predictive, and it’s much more difficult to determine by simply looking over a list of recent results.

The ATP rankings generally do a good job of telling us which players are better than others. But the official system has two major problems: It ignores opponent quality, and it artificially limits its scope to the last 52 weeks. Pundits and fans tend to have different problems: They often give too much credit to opponent quality (“He beat Djokovic, so now he’s number one!”) and exhibit an even more extreme recency bias (“He’s looked unbeatable this week!”).

Two systems that avoid these issues–Elo and Jrank–both place Djokovic comfortably ahead of Murray. These algorithms handle the details of recent matches and opponent quality differently from each other, but what they share in common is more important: They consider opponent quality and they don’t use an arbitrary time cutoff like the ATP ranking system does.

Here’s how the three methods would forecast a Djokovic-Murray match, were it held today:

  • ATP: Murray favored, 51.6% chance of winning
  • Elo: Djokovic favored, 61.6% chance of winning
  • Jrank: Djokovic favored, 57.0% chance of winning

Betting markets favored Djokovic by a margin of slightly more than 60/40 yesterday, though bettors probably gave him some of that edge because they thought Murray would be fatigued after his marathon match on Saturday.

As I wrote last week, Elo doesn’t deny that Murray has had a tremendous half-season. Instead, it gives him less credit than the official algorithm does for victories over lesser opponents (such as John Isner in the Paris Masters final), and it recognizes that he started his current run of form at an enormous disadvantage. With his title in London, Murray reached a new peak Elo rating, but it still isn’t enough to overtake Djokovic.

Even though Elo still prefers Novak by a healthy margin, it reflects how much the situation at the top of the ranking list has changed. At the beginning of 2016, Elo gave Djokovic a 76.5% chance of winning a head-to-head against Murray, and that probability rose as high as 81% in April. It fell below 70% after the Olympics, and the gap is now the smallest it has been since February 2011.

Last week illustrates how difficult it will be for Murray take over the #1 Elo ranking place. The pre-tournament Elo difference of 91 points between the two players has shrunk by only 8%, to 84 points. Murray’s win yesterday was worth a bit more than a measly seven points, but Djokovic had several opportunities to nudge his rating upwards in his first four matches, as well. Despite some of Novak’s head-scratching losses this fall, he still wins most of his matches–some of them against very good players–slowing the decline of his Elo rating.

Of course, Elo is just a measuring stick–like any ranking system, it doesn’t tell us what’s really happening on court. It’s possible that Murray has made a significant (and semi-permanent) leap forward or that Djokovic has taken a major step back. On the other hand, streaks happen even without such leaps, and they always end. The smart money is usually on small, gradual changes to the status quo, and Elo gives us a way to measure those changes.

For Elo to rate Murray ahead of Djokovic, it will probably require several more months of these gradual changes. The only faster alternative is for Djokovic to start losing more matches to the likes of Jiri Vesely and Sam Querrey. When faced with dramatic evidence, Elo makes more dramatic changes. While Djokovic has occasionally provided that evidence this season, he has usually offered enough proof–like four wins at the World Tour Finals–to comfortably maintain his position at the top.

Factchecking the History of the ATP Number One With Elo

As I wrote at The Economist this week, Andy Murray might sit atop the ATP rankings, but he probably isn’t the best player in tennis right now. That honor still belongs to Novak Djokovic, who comes in higher on the Elo ranking list, which uses an algorithm that is more predictive of match outcomes than the ATP table.

This isn’t the first time Elo has disagreed with the official rankings over the name at the top. Of the 26 men to have reached the ATP number one ranking, only 18 also became number one on the Elo list. A 19th player, Guillermo Coria, was briefly Elo #1 despite never achieving the same feat on the ATP rankings.

Four of the remaining eight players–Murray, Patrick Rafter, Marcelo Rios, and John Newcombe–climbed as high as #2 in the Elo rankings, while the last four–Thomas Muster, Carlos Moya, Marat Safin, and Yevgeny Kafelnikov–only got as high as #3. Moya and Kafelnikov are extreme cases of the rankings mismatch, as neither player spent even a single full season inside the Elo top five.

By any measure, though, Murray has spent a lot of time close to the top spot. What makes his current ascent to the #1 spot so odd is that in the past, Elo thought he was much closer. Despite his outstanding play over the last several months, there is still a 100-point Elo gap between him and Djokovic. That’s a lot of space: Most of the field at the WTA Finals in Singapore this year was within a little more than a 100-point range.

January 2010 was the Brit’s best shot. At the end of 2009, Murray, Djokovic, and Roger Federer were tightly packed at the top of the Elo leaderboard. In December, Murray was #3, but he trailed Fed–and the #1 position–by only 25 points. In January, Novak took over the top spot, and Murray closed to within 16 points–a small enough margin that one big upset could make the difference. Altogether, Murray has spent 63 weeks within 100 points of the Elo top spot, none of those since August 2013.

For most of the intervening three-plus years, Djokovic has been steadily setting himself apart from the pack. He reached his career Elo peak in April of this season, opening up a lead of almost 200 points over Federer, who was then #2, and 250 points over Murray. Since Roland Garros, Murray has closed the gap somewhat, but his lack of opportunities against highly-rated players has slowed his climb.

If Murray defeats Djokovic in the final this week in London, it will make the debate more interesting, not to mention secure the year-end ATP #1 ranking for the Brit. But it won’t affect the Elo standings. When two players have such lengthy track records, one match doesn’t come close to eliminating a 100-point gap. Novak will end the season as Elo #1, and he is well-positioned to maintain that position well into 2017.

Elina Svitolina and Multiple #1 Upsets

Last week in Beijing, Elina Svitolina beat new WTA #1 Angelique Kerber. It was the first time the Ukrainian defeated Kerber this season, but it wasn’t her first 2016 triumph over a player ranked #1. At the Rio Olympics in August, Svitolina upset then-top-ranked Serena Williams.

It’s unusual for a player to face two (or more) different #1-ranked opponents in the same season. Since 1985, it has happened 136 times on the WTA tour and 148 times on the ATP tour. That’s less than five times per season per tour.

Of course, it’s much less common to upset multiple #1-ranked opponents, as Svitolina did. This was only the 16th time a woman did so (again, since 1985), while it has happened on the men’s side 18 times.

Here is a full list of WTA player-seasons that featured defeats of more than one top-ranked player:

Year  Player               Upsets                      
2016  Elina Svitolina      Kerber; Serena              
2010  Samantha Stosur      Serena; Wozniacki           
2009  Venus Williams       Serena; Safina              
2008  Dinara Safina        Henin; Sharapova; Jankovic  
2006  Justine Henin        Davenport; Mauresmo         
2003  Justine Henin        Serena; Clijsters           
2002  Kim Clijsters        Serena; Venus               
2002  Serena Williams      Capriati; Venus             
2001  Lindsay Davenport    Capriati; Hingis            
1999  Amelie Mauresmo      Hingis; Davenport           
1999  Venus Williams       Davenport; Hingis           
1997  Amanda Coetzer       Hingis; Graf                
1996  Jana Novotna         Graf; Seles                 
1996  Kimiko Date Krumm    Graf; Seles                 
1991  Martina Navratilova  Graf; Seles                 
1991  Gabriela Sabatini    Graf; Seles

It’s quite an accomplished list. As we might expect, there’s a lot of overlap between the players who achieved these upsets and past and future #1-ranked players. The real standouts here are Justine Henin and Venus Williams, who managed the feat twice, and Dinara Safina, who faced three different #1s in 2008, going undefeated against them.

Here are the men who beat multiple #1s in the same season:

Year  Player                 Upsets             
2013  Juan Martin Del Potro  Nadal; Djokovic    
2012  Andy Murray            Federer; Djokovic  
2011  David Ferrer           Nadal; Djokovic    
2011  Jo Wilfried Tsonga     Nadal; Djokovic    
2010  Marcos Baghdatis       Nadal; Federer     
2009  Juan Martin Del Potro  Nadal; Federer     
2008  Andy Murray            Nadal; Federer     
2008  Gilles Simon           Nadal; Federer     
2003  Rainer Schuettler      Roddick; Agassi    
2003  Fernando Gonzalez      Hewitt; Agassi     
2001  Greg Rusedski          Safin; Kuerten     
2001  Max Mirnyi             Safin; Kuerten     
1995  Michael Chang          Agassi; Sampras    
1992  Richard Krajicek       Courier; Edberg    
1991  Guy Forget             Edberg; Becker     
1991  Andrei Cherkasov       Edberg; Becker     
1990  Boris Becker           Lendl; Edberg      
1988  Boris Becker           Wilander; Lendl

This list isn’t quite as impressive, though it does capture several very good players at their best.  It also highlights the world-beating potential of Max Mirnyi, who–despite never reaching the top 15 himself–finished the 2001 season with a 3-1 record against ATP #1s.

The rarity of facing multiple #1s in the same season–let alone beating them–stops us from drawing any meaningful conclusions about what Svitolina’s feat indicates for her future. At the very least, however, it reminds us of the Ukrainian’s potential as a future star, and puts her among some very good historical company.