The Improbable Rise of Emma Navarro

Also today: New stat leaderboards

Emma Navarro at the 2023 US Open. Credit: Hameltion

When Emma Navarro beat Elise Mertens for her first WTA title in Hobart on Saturday, it was only part of a natural progression. For more than a year now, she has shown a knack for winning, regardless of level, surface, or just about anything else. While most fans still don’t know her name, she’s up to 26th in the official rankings and 22nd on the Elo list.

The former collegiate champion–winner of the national title as a Virginia Cavalier in 2021–started her 2023 campaign just inside the top 150. She arrived at the brink of the top 100 with back-to-back ITF titles on clay in April, then cracked the top 60 with a grass-court final in Ilkley. Her first top-ten win came in September on hard courts, against Maria Sakkari in San Diego, and after a busy fall that included another two ITF titles, she broke into the top 40. She’s 8-1 so far in 2024; the only blip is a loss to Coco Gauff.

Altogether, that’s 72 victories since the beginning of last year. Not many women can boast so much success at the W25 level or higher in that span:

Player                   2023-24 Wins  
Arina Rodionova                    79  
Iga Swiatek                        73  
Emma Navarro                       72  
Oceane Dodin                       64  
Jessica Pegula                     62  
Julia Riera                        59  
Aryna Sabalenka                    59  
Martina Capurro Taborda            59  
Yafan Wang                         58  
Carlota Martinez Cirez             57

The remarkable part of Navarro’s rise is not the sheer quantity of positive results; it’s that she rose through the rankings so fast at the age she did. She first cracked the top 100 last May just before her 22nd birthday–hardly old by any rational standards, but nearly geriatric on the youth-driven WTA tour. The 25 players standing in front of Navarro in this week’s rankings broke into the top 100, on average, before their 20th birthday: The median is Aryna Sabalenka’s arrival at 19 years, 5 months. Late developers like Jessica Pegula, Barbora Krejcikova, and Navarro are exceptions to a long-standing rule.

It’s not unusual for a player to finally achieve a double-digit ranking when they are 21 or older, but it’s rare for a future star to do so–and now that Navarro is a tour-level title-holder ensconced in the top 30, she deserves that label. Since 1990, there have been 207 players who finished their age-21 season ranked between 101 and 200 without a previous appearance in the top 100. Only 25 of them reached #100 at the end of the following year; Navarro was only the fourth to crack the top 50.

Of those 200-plus players, only 35 of them ever achieved a top-40 ranking. (A few more, including Katie Boulter and Katie Volynets, could still join the group.) On average, it took them 1437 days–just short of four years–to do so. Navarro needed only 315 days, the second-fastest in the last 30-plus years. Here are the players who made the fastest move from the end of their age-21 season to the top 40:

Player                 Age 21  top 40 debut  Days  
Elise Mertens            2016    2017-08-28   245  
Emma Navarro             2022    2023-11-06   315  
Veronika Kudermetova     2018    2019-11-11   315  
Kurumi Nara              2012    2014-06-09   525  
Jamie Hampton            2011    2013-06-24   546  
Casey Dellacqua          2006    2008-07-28   581  
Tathiana Garbin          1998    2000-09-25   637  
Liudmila Samsonova       2019    2021-11-01   672  
Bethanie Mattek Sands    2006    2008-11-03   679  
Anne Kremer              1996    1999-04-12   833  
Jil Teichmann            2018    2021-04-26   847  
Zi Yan                   2005    2008-05-05   861  
Paula Badosa             2018    2021-05-24   875  
Yone Kamio               1992    1995-06-12   896  
Alison Riske Amritraj    2011    2014-06-09   896  
Johanna Konta            2012    2016-02-01  1127

It’s possible that Navarro could have been ready for the big time earlier had she not spent two years playing college tennis. Her sub-100 ranking at the end of 2022 was partly due to a limited schedule, as she played only a handful of tournaments before leaving school after the spring semester that year. But she wasn’t playing top-100 tennis when she did step on court: Elo ratings respond much more quickly to quality results (and do not reward quantity for its own sake), and her ranking by that algorithm, 148th, was virtually identical to her place on the official list.

Whatever the benefits and (temporary) costs of her stay at the University of Virginia, Navarro seemed to learn from the step up in competition–and quickly. She lost her first 11 matches against the top 50; in the last four months, she has won 5 of 6.

What works

The most memorable victory so far was Saturday’s triumph over Mertens for a debut WTA title. It was a grind, taking two hours, 50 minutes, and spanning 14 breaks of serve en route to a 6-1, 4-6, 7-5 finish. There was little first-strike tennis on display, as the average point ran to 5.5 strokes. 69 points required seven shots or more, and 37 reached double digits.

The battle for openings worked to Navarro’s advantage. In a sample of eleven previous matches logged by the Match Charting Project, she struggled in longer rallies, winning just 46% of points that reached a seventh shot compared to 49% overall. On Saturday, she reversed that trend in a big way, out-point-constructing her veteran opponent and winning a whopping 59% of the longer points. Of 84 charted Mertens matches, it was only the eighth time that she played at least 20 long points and won so few of them. Among the few players to beat her so soundly on rally tactics: Pegula and Simona Halep.

While Navarro’s results have steadily improved, her game plan is still recognizable form her days as a college champion. After defeating Miami’s Estrela Perez-Somarriba for the 2021 NCAA title, she described her approach: “I was able to dictate with my forehand and finish a lot of points with my backhand.” In Hobart, her backhand continued to populate the highlight reel, with seven clean down-the-line winners. But it was the forehand that opened the court in the first place.

She played, essentially, a clay-court match, using the forehand to create opportunities for the next ball. She hit winners with 7% of her forehand groundstrokes, slightly below tour average. But when she was able to hit a forehand, she won the point 62% of the time, an outstanding figure for a close match. One point serves as an illustration of the rest: At 2-all, 15-all in the third set, Navarro converted a return point with a down-the-line backhand winner on the 14th shot of the rally. After a deep forehand return, Navarro was forced to hit two backhands. When she was finally able to deploy the forehand on the 8th shot, she stabilized the point by going down the middle. The 10th shot took advantage of a let cord with a heavy crosscourt forehand, a weapon that worked in her favor on Saturday more than two-thirds of the time. Her next forehand went the other direction, creating the space for–finally–a backhand out of the Belgian’s reach.

While not every point was quite so tactical, point construction always lurked. Mertens frequently attempted a pattern where she would go the same direction with two consecutive groundstrokes then, having wrong-footed Navarro with the second of them, go for a winner. The sequence doesn’t work against a big swinger because the points don’t last long enough. That wasn’t a problem against the American, but Navarro’s resourcefulness nullified the tactic nonetheless. Unlike many players her age, Navarro is able to use slices off both wings to neutralize points, and she often did so on the second shot of Mertens’s would-be pattern. The Hobart champion hit 40 slices over the course of the match, ultimately winning the point on 20 of them. For a defensive shot, rescuing 50% of those situations counts as a victory.

There is little in Navarro’s game that advertises her as a world-beater: The weapons I’ve described work best as part of a carefully-managed package. She may prove to be most dangerous on clay, where aggressive opponents will have a harder time keeping points short. She might also develop yet another level. Twelve months ago, only a reckless forecaster would have predicted she could rise so high, so quickly. We still haven’t seen her peak.

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Deep leaderboards

Among the cult favorites on the Tennis Abstract site are the tour leaderboard pages, which contain nearly 60 sortable stats for the top 50 players on each circuit. Many of those stats aren’t available anywhere else, including things like average opponent ranking and time per match. It’s also possible to filter the matches for each calculation to determine things like the best hold percentages on clay.

Last week I introduced three new pages that extend the same concept:

Here’s just one example of what’s possible, the best WTA players outside the top 50 by ace percentage:

These are a great way to identify standout skills of lesser-known players. All of the leaderboards update every Monday.

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Jelena Ostapenko In the Hands of Fate

Also today: Deciding tiebreaks, a MCP milestone, and assorted links.

Jelena Ostapenko in 2023. Credit: Hameltion

If you’ve ever spent five minutes watching Jelena Ostapenko play tennis, you know she’s as aggressive as it gets. She swings for the fences and sometimes knocks them over. Get her on a hot streak, and opponents can only hope its ends before the handshake. When she’s off her game, spectators in the first few rows duck for cover.

What you might not realize is just how aggressive she is. A few years ago I tuned Lowell West’s Aggression Score metric so that the numbers fell in a range between 0 and 100. In theory, 0 is maximally passive; 100 is go-for-broke, all the time. Ostapenko’s career Aggression Score in rallies is 175.

This sort of extreme style lends itself to all sorts of narratives. She can beat anybody, any time, as she showed when she won the 2017 French Open as an unseeded player, and again last year when she upset Iga Swiatek at the US Open–her fourth win in as many matches against the Pole. That makes her a perennial dark horse pick at majors. Even though she hasn’t reached a semi-final since 2018, neither Iga nor Coco Gauff–who exited the Australian Open after an Ostapenko barrage last year–would like her find her in their section.

(Sorry Iga: Guess who you might face in the quarters!)

Hyper-aggressive players also appear to be works in progress. Especially early in Ostapenko’s career, commentators would talk about her stratospheric potential if she could only improve her footwork, or play a bit more “within herself.” That is, not quite so many winners, not quite so soon, more point construction, fewer unforced errors. But players rarely change much, and as they age, they are more likely to become more aggressive, not less. The Latvian is now 26 years old, beginning her ninth year on tour. What you see is what you get.

What you get, it turns out, is a lot of close matches. Ostapenko played 30 three-setters last year, including four in a row to reach the Birmingham final and another four straight to start the US Open. Alona’s apotheosis came at Indian Wells, when she faced fellow super-aggressor Petra Kvitova in the third round. Both women tallied exactly 75 points; Kvitova won, 0-6, 6-0, 6-4. Tennis ball fuzz could be seen floating over the desert for days afterward.

That particular scoreline was an oddity, but the margin of victory was not. Ostapenko’s tight matches are not a result of streakiness, flightiness, or anything of the sort. They are an unavoidable function of her game style. It’s almost impossible to hit lots of winners without also committing piles of unforced errors. (We’ll come back to that.) When you do both in such numbers, you personally account for a substantial majority of point outcomes. The winners and errors (very approximately) balance each other out, and unless your opponent does something remarkable–or remarkably bad–with the limited influence you leave her, you end up winning about half the points played.

No one takes the racket out of an opponent’s hand like Ostapenko does. Once the return is in play, the Latvian ends nearly two-thirds of points herself, with a winner or unforced error, or by forcing an error. No one else comes close. Drawing on Match Charting Project data, I’ve listed the active players who end the most rallies:

Player                 RallyEnd%  
Jelena Ostapenko           65.9%  
Petra Kvitova              61.6%  
Madison Keys               60.8%  
Liudmila Samsonova         60.0%  
Camila Giorgi              59.7%  
Aryna Sabalenka            59.7%  
Veronika Kudermetova       57.5%  
Danielle Collins           57.5%  
Ekaterina Alexandrova      57.2%  
Ons Jabeur                 56.8%  
Peyton Stearns             56.5%  
Caroline Garcia            56.2%  
Naomi Osaka                56.2%  
Varvara Gracheva           55.0%  
Iga Swiatek                55.0%

Here’s another way to look at Alona’s extreme position on this list. The only other woman to grade out so far from 50% is Madison Brengle, who ends fewer than 34% of rallies. Ostapenko’s power turns the rest of the tour into Brengle.

Give and take

Ending even 57% of points on your own racket requires a lot of big swings. When you aim for a line, you might feel confidence about your chances, but you are taking a risk. A few players, like Swiatek, can generate winners without paying the unforced-error penalty, but that takes an unusual combination of patience and power that most players do not possess.

The 66% of points that Ostapenko ends on her own racket divides into roughly 37% winners (and forced errors) and 29% unforced errors. That’s worse than Aryna Sabalenka, who hits nearly as many winners with only a 23% error rate, but compared to the tour as a whole, the ratio is a solid one. For every unforced error she commits, she ends 1.25 points in her favor. Average among players represented in the Match Charting Project is 1.16, and the true mean is probably lower than that, since the MCP is more heavily weighted toward the best players.

The ratio varies among players, but there is a fairly strong relationship. Here are the winner/forced error and unforced error rates–each as a percentage of all points where the return came back in play–for 140 current and recent players:

The correlation between the two rates (r2 = 0.3) would be even stronger if it weren’t for net-rushers like Tatjana Maria–and to some extent Leylah Fernandez–who force their passive opponents into more aggression than they would otherwise produce.

As Sabalenka shows, it’s possible to seize as many points as Ostapenko does without giving quite so many away, but even that may be a mirage: Sabalenka racks up winners behind an overpowering serve that the Latvian can’t match. If the plot above is any indication, it would be difficult to bring her error rate down without also sacrificing some winners, not to mention the élan that she has ridden to seven tour-level titles.

So we’re left with something of a paradox. A hyper-aggressive player has more control over her fate than her peers do, but that control comes at a cost of a towering error rate, which keeps matches close. One result is a week like this one in Adelaide, where Ostapenko has reached the final by slipping through perilously tight battles with Sorana Cirstea (51.7% of points won) and Caroline Garcia (50.2%). Both matches could’ve gone the other way, something that is true so often when the Latvian steps on court. My tactical advice for Daria Kasatkina in tomorrow’s final: Cross your fingers.

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Deciding-set tiebreak records

AbsurDB asks:

[A]m I right that Hurkacz’s 15 deciding sets going into tie-breaks in one calendar year is a historical record in ATP (10 such tie-breaks won is also probably a record?)?

Indeed, both are records. According to my data, the previous records came from Ivo Karlovic’s 2007 season, when he reached 11 deciding-set tiebreaks, winning eight of them. Here are all the player-seasons with nine or more.

Player              Season  Dec TB  Record  
Hubert Hurkacz        2023      15    10-5  
Ivo Karlovic          2007      11     8-3  
John Isner            2011      11     4-7  
John Isner            2018      11     6-5  
Ivo Karlovic          2014      10     7-3  
John Isner            2017      10     5-5  
Kevin Anderson        2018      10     6-4  
Mark Philippoussis    2000       9     5-4  
Marat Safin           2000       9     5-4  
Ivan Ljubicic         2002       9     2-7  
Ivan Ljubicic         2007       9     8-1  
Ivo Karlovic          2008       9     5-4  
Sam Querrey           2018       9     1-8  
Borna Coric           2019       9     6-3  
Hubert Hurkacz        2022       9     3-6

(Yes, I checked before 2000, as well, but no one reached nine until Philippousis did so that year. The first player-season with eight deciding-set tiebreaks was Tom Gullikson’s, in 1984.)

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MCP Milestones

Earlier this week, the Match Charting Project recorded its two-millionth point:

The milestone match was the Auckland second-rounder between Ben Shelton and Fabian Marozsan, which I charted as a warm-up for my article on Wednesday. We’re not resting on our laurels, of course: We’ve added another five matches (and 800 or so points) in the 48 hours since.

Also worth mentioning is another round number we reached in the offseason: 1,000 different ATP players. Apart from the name syou’d expect, it’s a healthy mix of lower-ranked active players and former tour regulars. #1,000 was Martin Jaite, via his 1987 Rome final against Mats Wilander. We’ve also now charted 800 different WTAers.

We stand about 200 charts away from 13,000 matches overall: approximately 7,000 men’s and 6,000 women’s. 2023 was our most productive year yet, and 2024 would be a great time to start contributing.

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Assorted links

  • Earlier this week I appeared on Alex Gruskin’s Mini-Break Podcast, in which he got overexcited about a number of week one trends, and I tried to talk him down from all the ledges.
  • I wrote about how GPT4 helped me make Tennis Abstract’s new navbar, because you had to know I didn’t do it myself.
  • The tours have introduced a new policy on late matches. I’m underwhelmed: There are an awful lot of exceptions, and there’s no acknowledgement of the underlying problem of longer and longer matches.
  • Two student projects worth a look: Pramukh’s Evaluating Tennis Player Styles in Relation to Tour Averages, based on MCP data, and Amrit’s Aces over Expected model.
  • If you can’t wait until Sunday for grand slam tennis, here’s the Clijsters-Henin 2003 US Open final.

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What Is Ben Shelton’s Ceiling?

Also today: First serve stats, and new Tennis Abstract reports.

Ben Shelton. Credit: 350z33

Ben Shelton is one of the rising stars of men’s tennis, the most exciting young player this side of Carlos Alcaraz. He possesses a monster serve, he’s not afraid to unleash old-school tactics, and he wears his heart on his sleeve. It’s impossible to root against this guy.

Shelton is also, by the standards of the game’s elite, not a very good returner.

Any discussion of his potential has to come to terms with this most obvious limitation. His rocket of a lefty serve will never hold him back; indeed, it’s already earned him places in the US Open semi-finals and the Australian Open quarters. You don’t have to do much dreaming to see him going even further and winning a major outright. What’s tougher to forecast is the sort of sustained performance that would take him to the top of the rankings.

Last year, Shelton won 32.6% of his return points at tour level. Average among the top 50 was 37.1%, and the top four players on the circuit (and Alex de Minaur) all topped 40%. Of the top 50, only Christopher Eubanks, at 30.9%, came in below Shelton.

There’s plenty of time for Ben to improve, and I’ll get to that in a moment. But first, let me show you the list of the year-end top-ten players with the lowest percentage of return points won (RPW%) since 1991, when the ATP began to keep these stats:

Player              Season  Rank   RPW%  
John Isner            2018    10  29.4%  
Kevin Anderson        2018     6  33.7%  
Milos Raonic          2014     8  33.8%  
Andy Roddick          2007     6  34.0%  
Hubert Hurkacz        2023     9  34.3%  
Greg Rusedski         1997     6  34.5%  
Matteo Berrettini     2019     8  34.6%  
Ivan Ljubicic         2005     9  34.6%  
Hubert Hurkacz        2022    10  34.7%  
Greg Rusedski         1998     9  34.7%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas    2023     6  34.7%  
Mark Philippoussis    2003     9  34.8%  
Andy Roddick          2010     8  34.9%  
Pete Sampras          1996     1  35.3%  
Jo Wilfried Tsonga    2009    10  35.3%  
Goran Ivanisevic      1995    10  35.4%  
Andy Roddick          2009     7  35.5%  
Pete Sampras          2000     3  35.5%  
Pete Sampras          2001    10  35.6%  
Andy Roddick          2008     8  35.6%

In 33 years, out of 330 top-ten finishes, only one man has reached the threshold with a RPW% lower than Shelton’s last year. And it’s someone you can’t exactly pattern a career after: If you look up “outlier” in the dictionary, you find John Isner’s face staring back at you.

Even more striking to me is that no one has finished in the top five with a RPW% below 35%. Then comes another outlier, Pete Sampras and his 1996 campaign. If your goal is to finish a season at number one, you’ll usually need a strong return. Sampras and Andy Roddick are the only two men who have topped the rankings with a RPW% below 38%. Otherwise, you’ve got to ask yourself one question: Are you Pete Sampras?

Here are the lowest RPW% numbers for top-three finishers since 1991:

Player           Season  Rank   RPW%  
Pete Sampras       1996     1  35.3%  
Pete Sampras       2000     3  35.5%  
Andy Roddick       2005     3  36.0%  
Milos Raonic       2016     3  36.1%  
Andy Roddick       2003     1  36.4%  
Casper Ruud        2022     3  36.9%  
Pete Sampras       1999     3  37.3%  
Andy Roddick       2004     2  37.5%  
Boris Becker       1994     3  37.6%  
Michael Stich      1993     2  37.9%  
Pete Sampras       1998     1  38.0%  
Marat Safin        2000     2  38.1%  
Grigor Dimitrov    2017     3  38.2%  
Patrick Rafter     1997     2  38.2%  
Roger Federer      2009     1  38.3%

(Did you expect to see Casper Ruud on this list? I did not.)

Shelton’s serve means that he could reach the top without the return-game success of Alcaraz or Novak Djokovic. But if he wants to move beyond the fringes of the top ten, this second table shows the range he needs to aim for. Setting aside the hot-and-cold tactics of Pistol Pete (we’ll come back to that, too), we can simplify things and say that a would-be world-beater needs to get his RPW% up around 36% or 37%.

How much can a return improve?

Bettering your core stats is possible, but not easy. Another lefty, Feliciano Lopez, offers a cautionary tale. In his age-20 season, he won 31.7% of return points, not far below Shelton’s mark. Here’s how his career developed:

Lopez didn’t top 34% for more than a decade, and he only reached 35% when he was 34 years old. In seven of his ten seasons between the ages of 21 and 30, his return was no more than 1.5 percentage points better than that first season.

Here’s another one. Milos Raonic won 33.5% of his return points as a 20-year-old. He’s a better comp for Shelton, because Raonic’s serve was similarly effective as well. This graph shows how Raonic’s return evolved:

He barely improved on that 33.5% mark until 2016, when he peaked at number three in the ATP rankings, and he couldn’t sustain it. His career RPW% went into the books at 33.9%.

Many of you, I’m sure, are ready to object: Lopez was never the pure athlete that Shelton is! Raonic certainly wasn’t, and he played through one injury after another. Fair enough–if there are natural gifts that make it more likely that a player develops a tour-average return game after arriving on tour, Ben probably has them. Tough to argue with that.

Still, the numbers are brutal. There have been 99 players who racked up 20 or more tour-level matches in their age-20 season since 1991. 22 of them never improved–they never won return points at a higher rate than they did when they were 20. Of the lucky ones who managed to do better at some point in their careers, their peak was, on average, 1.7 percentage points higher than their age 20 number. For Shelton, that’s a peak RPW% of 34.3%, well below the targets established above.

Of that group of 99 20-year-olds, one out of ten improved (eventually) by at least ten percent–not percentage points–a gain that would move Shelton up to 35.9%, essentially the border of where he needs to be for a top-three finish. Let’s not understate the difficulty of the task. Players who reach tour level by age 20 are extremely promising, almost without exception, and Ben needs to put himself in the top tenth of that group.

It’s not obvious why boosting your return-game results is so difficult, or so rare. (It’s harder than improving serve stats, but that’s a topic for another day.) One factor is that as you climb the rankings, you face tougher opponents, so even if your game gets better, your stats appear to stagnate. The median rank of Shelton’s opponents last year was 54.5. The same number for Andrey Rublev is 40, and Daniil Medvedev’s was 27.

Another reason is that returning is a young man’s game. The skills that contribute to the service return–vision, reaction time, quickness, speed–peak early. I have no doubt that Lopez, Raonic, and just about everybody else on tour worked hard to get more out of their return over the years, but many of their gains simply cancelled out the losses they suffered from the aging process.

Beyond RPW%

Sampras was famous for tanking some return games, then going all-out late in the set. The energy-saving strategy was time-tested, going back another half-century to the “Big Game” theories of Jack Kramer and his mentor Cliff Roche. If you hold your serve (almost) every time you toe the line, you only need to break once–or win the tiebreak. Why waste the effort on every return point?

Shelton doesn’t go quite that far; he rarely looks apathetic on return. But he clearly gets energized when an opportunity presents itself, or when he decides it’s time to create one. If a player can consistently play better in big moments, his RPW% won’t tell the whole story. Nick Krygios did this on break points, though it wasn’t enough to get him into the top ten.

There’s some evidence that Shelton does as well. If he always played the same way–the level that earned him 32.6% of his return points–a simple model would predict that he would break serve 13.3% of the time. Instead, he broke 16% of the time, a rate that the model would have predicted for a returner winning 34.4% of points. Still not top-three territory, but getting closer.

Isner often overcame his return woes by securing more tiebreaks than his first-twelve-game performance would have suggested. He won more than 60% of his career breakers, coming close to a 70% mark in two separate seasons. Shelton might be using similar tactics, but he isn’t yet getting the same sort of results: He went a modest 18-16 in tiebreaks last season.

What about break points? This is one area where Sampras noticeably stepped up his game. From 1991 to 2000, he won 44 more break points than expected, based on his return-point stats on non-break points. It’s not a huge advantage–about one extra break of serve every 16 matches–but most players break even. This is one way in which Pete’s RPW% understated his effectiveness on return.

Here, Shelton really shines. My model suggests that he “should” have won break points at a 35.0% clip last year, since on average, players win break points more frequently than other return points. (Break points arise more often against weaker servers.) Incredibly, Ben won more than 41% of his break point chances. Instead of 96 breaks of serve, he earned 114. Since 1991, only a few dozen players have ever outperformed break point expectations by such a wide margin for a full season. Sampras never did, though he once got close.

If Shelton can sustain that level of break-point play, we might as well make room for him in the Hall of Fame right now. A modest improvement in RPW%, combined with reliably clutch performance in the big moments, would move him into the Sampras/Roddick range, where big servers can break serve just enough to catapult to the top of the rankings.

But… it’s a big if. Sampras averaged just four or five extra breaks per season, and he’s one of the all-time greats. In 2003, James Blake also exceeded break-point expectations by a margin of 18. The next year his score was negative 5. Across 2,600 pairs of player-seasons, there’s virtually no correlation between break point performance one year and the next. Shelton may defy the odds, just as Isner rewrote the book on tiebreak performance. But the smart money says that he won’t be so lucky this year.

Where does this leave us? If we’re optimistic about Shelton’s athleticism, commitment, and coaching team, there’s reason to expect that he’ll eventually win more return points–though probably not enough to reach the 36% threshold that usually marks off the top three. If he proves able to execute Kramer/Sampras/Kyrgios tactics under pressure, that might be enough to make up the difference. If he can do that, and he can remain as fearsome a server as he already appears to be, we might have a multi-slam winner, a top-three, maybe even number one player on our hands. The ceiling is high, but the ladder is steep.

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First serve dominance

James Fawcette asks:

[At the United Cup] de Minaur lost only 1 point behind his first serve vs Djokovic, 33 of 34. Has anyone ever won every first serve point vs the then world number one in a completed match?

No!

Going back to 1991, when the ATP started keeping these stats, no one else lost only one, either. Here are the 18 matches in which a player lost three or fewer first-serve points against the world number one. In seven of the matches (noted with asterisks), all that big serving was for naught, and the favorite won anyway.

Tournament         Rd   Winner      Loser       Lost     
2024 United Cup    QF   de Minaur   Djokovic       1     
1992 Tour Finals   RR   Ivanisevic  Courier        2     
1993 Osaka         QF   Courier     Raoux          2  *  
1993 Tour Finals   RR   Sampras     Bruguera       2  *  
1996 Dusseldorf    RR   Kafelnikov  Sampras        2     
2000 Miami         SF   Kuerten     Agassi         2     
2002 Hamburg       QF   Safin       Hewitt         2     
2008 Indian Wells  SF   Fish        Federer        2     
2011 Tour Finals   RR   Ferrer      Djokovic       2     
1992 Paris         QF   Becker      Courier        3     
1992 Brussels      R16  Courier     Leconte        3  *  
1996 Tour Finals   SF   Sampras     Ivanisevic     3  *  
2000 Scottsdale    R16  Clavet      Agassi         3     
2002 Rome          R32  Moya        Hewitt         3     
2008 Halle         SF   Federer     Kiefer         3  *  
2008 Olympics      R64  Federer     Tursunov       3  *  
2010 Tour Finals   F    Federer     Nadal          3     
2018 Canada        R32  Nadal       Paire          3  *

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New toys

Yesterday I added two new features to Tennis Abstract. First, there’s a list of today’s birthdays:

Second, there’s a “Bakery Report” (one each for men and women) with comprehensive stats on 6-0 and 6-1 sets won and lost:

The birthday list will update daily, and the bakery report will refresh every Monday, expect in the middle of grand slams.

Enjoy!

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How Grigor Dimitrov Unbalanced Holger Rune in Brisbane

Grigor Dimitrov. Credit: Bradley Kanaris / Getty

Grigor Dimitrov was long known as “Baby Fed,” but yesterday, Holger Rune was the one trying to do a Roger Federer impression. Facing break point at 3-all in the second set, Rune kicked a second serve wide, got a cross-court slice reply, then ran around his backhand to smack an inside-in forehand: a high-risk, high-reward shot, especially if you aim for the line. Rune went big and he pulled it wide. That was the only break of the match.

The 20-year-old had already missed one of those in the same game: The first error dug him a 15-40 hole. Over the course of the match, he attempted seven inside-in forehands, a shot that usually wins him two out of three points. Against Dimitrov, he blew four of them.

The errors are a symptom of one of something separating Rune from the top of the game. In his eagerness to maintain an aggressive position at the baseline–a willingness that defines his style and, in fairness, often pays off–he tries a bit too hard. He swings to end points in three shots that probably need to go five. He keeps a toe on the baseline when he ought to be one step further back.

This isn’t a secret, and Dimitrov exploited it. The Bulgarian landed 82% of his returns behind the service line, compared to a tour average of 70%. 39% of Dimitrov’s returns fell in the back quarter of the court, beating the 28% that players typically face. In rallies, the veteran kept pummeling Rune’s feet, prioritizing depth over direction.

The strategy worked. Take the other pivotal juncture of the match, early in the first-set tiebreak. Serving at 0-1, Rune pushed Dimitrov off the court with an inside-out forehand, which came back as a deep slice. Nothing special, but as Rune stepped back to accommodate it, he hit an equally indifferent reply. Dimitrov came back with another middle-deep backhand and Rune hit the tape with as pedestrian an error as you’ll ever see. At 0-2, Rune’s plus-one forehand forced Dimitrov deep and set up the point for an easy finish–or so he thought. Dimitrov managed to get his defensive forehand deep enough that Rune stepped in–his back foot on the baseline–and the result was another miss that would leave a club player berating himself.

On both points, a slightly more conservative court position, or a better last-minute adjustment step, would have let Rune continue the rally with his opponent on the run. Most players tread more carefully in tiebreaks. Instead, he missed twice and fell to 0-3. He got one point back but couldn’t close the entire gap and lost the first set, 7-6(5).

Middle-deep mediocrity

Yesterday wasn’t the first time that Rune misreads a neutral opportunity as a chance to go big. His own-the-baseline strategy is a mixed bag, the best example of which is how he responds to service returns that land at his feet. The Match Charting Project codes every return by direction (cross-court, middle, or down-the-line) and by depth (shallow–in front of the service line, deep–behind it, or very deep–in the back quarter of the court). Dimitrov placed 13 of his returns in the middle-deep region, and Rune saved just 5 of those points.

When a return lands middle-deep, the point is fully up for grabs. Counting both first- and second-serve points, the server wins roughly 49% of the time from that position. (Once a deep return is in play, any lingering effect of a big serve is mostly erased.) A top player should do better, but Rune does not. Here are the career outcomes of those points for the current ATP top four, plus the two Brisbane finalists:

Player             W/FE%   UFE%  PtsWon%  
Novak Djokovic      6.8%   7.1%    53.8%  
Jannik Sinner       5.7%   6.0%    51.6%  
Daniil Medvedev     5.3%   5.9%    50.6%  
Carlos Alcaraz      8.0%   6.2%    50.1%  
Grigor Dimitrov     9.6%   7.9%    49.6%  
--Average--         7.4%   8.7%    48.9%  
Holger Rune        11.5%  10.9%    48.0% 

Rune is much more aggressive than his peers in these situations. It may feel like it pays off, since he ends more points with winners (or forced errors) than unforced errors. But the bottom line tells another story: He wins fewer points than average, and trails the best players in the game by a sizeable margin. As Djokovic, Sinner, and Medvedev can tell you, from a neutral position, immediate outcomes don’t matter as much as point construction.

It’s the same story later in the rally. Dimitrov won those two crucial tiebreak points by putting his second shot near the baseline. The serve return isn’t unique: Any stroke that lands in the middle-deep region turns the point into a 50-50 proposition. The above table showed how players fare from that position on the plus-one shot. Here are the numbers for everything after that:

Player           Winner%   UFE%  PtsWon%  
Carlos Alcaraz      8.2%  12.8%    55.3%  
Grigor Dimitrov     6.6%   6.3%    54.7%  
Novak Djokovic      6.2%   8.0%    54.6%  
Jannik Sinner       7.2%  10.5%    52.3%  
Daniil Medvedev     4.7%   6.8%    52.0%  
--Average--         7.1%  10.2%    49.3%  
Holger Rune         9.4%   9.7%    49.0%

The order changes, and Rune’s aggression doesn’t stand out like it does earlier in the rally. But the message is the same, only with a wider margin. Given the mix of players represented in the Match Charting Project, “average” is better than tour average, but it’s still a number Rune needs to surpass.

The second table, finally, brings us back to Dimitrov. If he hadn’t played yesterday, I wouldn’t have thought to include him on the list with the top four, but in this type of situation–one that demands both patience and tactical soundness–he rates with the best in the game.

Faced with an over-aggressive, slightly erratic opponent, the 32-year-old took advantage and turned in a workmanlike performance. That isn’t a dig: Dimitrov didn’t need fireworks, just steadiness. By my count, he racked up just 10 unforced errors to Rune’s 29, and just one of them–serving for 4-0 in the tiebreak–came a critical moment. It’s nothing so flashy as the “Baby Fed” moniker once promised, but Dimitrov’s mature game has gotten him up to 7th place on the Elo list, and a return to the official top ten is not far away.

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Angelique Kerber in the New World

Angelique Kerber in 2020. Credit: Rob Keating

Angelique Kerber’s return to the tour has, so far, been a rocky one. She began Germany’s United Cup campaign with a narrow defeat to Jasmine Paolini, in which the Italian earned 21 break points against the German’s serve. Kerber took a set from the free-swinging Caroline Garcia but lost in three. Today, Maria Sakkari blew her off the court, winning nine games in a row before Kerber got on the board and split the remaining six.

The United Cup, in its new design, is not an easy place to make a comeback: The German faced top-30 players all three rounds. (Compare that to the tour event in Brisbane, where fellow returnee Naomi Osaka scored an opening-round victory against a player ranked 83rd.) Kerber surely didn’t expect to dominate immediately. It’s hard to get rolling again after an 18-month layoff, and she hasn’t been a truly elite player since early 2019. She turns 36 years old this month, a tough age even for players with three majors to their credit.

The Garcia match, in particular, highlighted another dimension of the challenge. The tour that Kerber rejoins is different from the one where she collected so many laurels. Angie is the very definition of a counterpuncher, a clever defender who uses anticipation and racket control to convert her opponent’s pace into winners of her own. It’s tough to counterpunch against someone like Garcia, who aims to end the point with nearly every shot.

The reckless Frenchwoman is hardly alone. Based on data from the Match Charting Project, here is the average rally length on the WTA tour since 2013:

It looks a bit fluky, but it’s noteworthy to find a peak in 2016, Kerber’s best year. Rally length has been essentially flat since 2021, perhaps since 2019 if we set aside the Covid-affected 2020 season. The German is plenty familiar with the landscape, having competed on tour until Wimbledon in 2022, but she developed her game back when the power of Serena Williams was an outlier. Now, Serena’s late-career bashing is the model for a new generation.

There are a number of ways to illustrate the trend. While the year-to-year differences are minor, the arrows all point in the same direction. In 2016, 49.6% of points were decided in three shots or less. Last year, it was 53.0%. (In 2021 and 2022, it was a bit higher still.) At Kerber’s peak, nearly 24% of points lasted at least seven strokes. Last year that figure had declined to 20.8%.

This is probably worse news for someone like Caroline Wozniacki than it is for Kerber. Woz keeps points alive and waits for errors, skills that Garcia (or Aryna Sabalenka, or Elena Rybakina, or dozens more players she might draw in the first round of the Australian Open) render meaningless. While Angie isn’t going to pile up aces–she’s hit a grand total of two in three United Cup matches–she is fully capable of redirecting a serve for a return winner, as she did a couple of times against Sakkari. Still, the shorter the point, the less likely that Kerber finds an opportunity to work her magic.

Throughout her career, the German lefty has rarely had a problem picking spots to end points with winners or forced errors. Match Charting data shows that 6% of her groundstrokes go for winners, right in line with tour average.

The catch, though, is when she hits them. Kerber is one of 58 players for whom the Match Charting Project has recorded at least 2,000 winners and forced errors since 2013. Only four of those players unleash their winners later in the rally. The average shot number of Kerber’s point-enders is 4.9–bad news in an era when nearly two-thirds of points are finished in four shots or less.

Here are the twelve players in the dataset whose winners occur latest in the rally:

Player                Avg Winner Shot#  
Daria Kasatkina                    5.1  
Viktorija Golubic                  5.0  
Yulia Putintseva                   5.0  
Carla Suarez Navarro               4.9  
Angelique Kerber                   4.9  
Sloane Stephens                    4.9  
Agnieszka Radwanska                4.9  
Simona Halep                       4.8  
Svetlana Kuznetsova                4.7  
Anastasija Sevastova               4.6  
Caroline Wozniacki                 4.6  
Su Wei Hsieh                       4.6

This isn’t a table where you want to find your name north of Wozniacki’s. It’s possible to survive on today’s tour playing this way, as Daria Kasatkina has proven, but it is much less likely to translate into a major title. Wimbledon champ Marketa Vondrousova didn’t miss the list by much, coming in at 4.4, but her aggression varies wildly from one match to another. Iga Swiatek and Coco Gauff appear closer to the middle of the pack, at 4.2, and Aryna Sabalenka ranks as the fourth most aggressive of the 58, at 3.4.

At the risk of belaboring the point, here’s another way of seeing the difference between Angie’s style and the brands of tennis that currently top the rankings. The following chart shows what percent of Kerber’s winners (and forced errors) happen at each point in the rally, compared to the same figures for Swiatek and Sabalenka:

The “1st shot” and “6th+” columns are virtual mirror images of each other. Even that understates the difference between the veteran and the two youngsters, because a point-ending serve from Kerber is more likely to be at least partially the fault of the returner–those errors are conventionally scored as forced regardless of the strength of the serve.

I don’t want to say that Kerber can’t succeed on her return to the circuit, but it’s clear that she faces a challenge. The tennis world of the mid-2010s is long gone, and even if she regains the form that took her to number one in 2016, it may not give her the same results in 2024. A new era requires a new Angie; we’ll see if she can produce one.

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Hubi’s Three-Set Magic

Also today: Torben Ulrich (1928-2023); What is this?

Hubert Hurkacz: Let’s play three!

Hubert Hurkacz started the 2024 season right where he left off. In the round-robin stage of the United Cup, he played two singles matches, beating Thiago Seyboth Wild and losing to Alejandro Davidovich Fokina. Both matches went to a third set.

No one played more deciding third sets in 2023 than Hurkacz. Out of 55 best-of-three starts, he went the distance 32 times. That’s more three-setters–and a higher rate of them (58%)–than any player-season this century. On average, about 35% of ATP matches go three. Since 2000, only 16 players have posted a full season where they went to a third set more than half the time.

This is new territory for the 26-year-old from Poland. He reached a decider in only 35% of his three-setters in 2021, then increased that clip to 45% in 2022. The main difference between his 2022 and 2023 seasons was that his already small margins shrunk even further. He won matches at almost the same rate both years, even though he broke a bit less often and was less effective with his second serve in 2023. He converted his three-setters at exactly the same rate (62.5%) in both seasons. Hurkacz’s edge was still enough to keep him in the top ten, but only because he was willing to play so much tennis.

It’s a bit fluky to pile up so many three-setters, but we can get a hint at some trends by looking at the list of similar warriors:

Year  Player                  Bo3  Deciders   Dec%  
2023  Hubert Hurkacz           55        32  58.2%  
2018  John Isner               40        23  57.5%  
2022  Taylor Fritz             55        31  56.4%  
2010  John Isner               48        27  56.3%  
2019  Nikoloz Basilashvili     43        24  55.8%  
2014  Guillermo Garcia Lopez   42        23  54.8%  
2019  Fernando Verdasco        42        23  54.8%  
2018  Robin Haase              46        25  54.3%  
2009  Julien Benneteau         48        26  54.2%  
2005  Jurgen Melzer            39        21  53.8%  
2007  Dmitry Tursunov          41        22  53.7%  
2017  Jack Sock                51        27  52.9%  
2011  Stan Wawrinka            40        21  52.5%  
2013  John Isner               52        27  51.9%  
2017  Albert Ramos             54        28  51.9%  
2018  Joao Sousa               45        23  51.1%  
2000  Fernando Vicente         47        24  51.1%  
2013  Robin Haase              49        25  51.0%  
2003  Gaston Gaudio            55        28  50.9%  
2006  Dmitry Tursunov          61        31  50.8%

There are plenty of clay-court grinders on the list; that doesn’t really apply to Hubi. What pops out to me are the three appearances of John Isner. While Hurkacz isn’t as one-dimensional as Big John, he has the same sort of profile. Only four other players in the current top 50–none of them in the top 15–break serve as rarely as he does. When breaks are scarce, sets go to tiebreaks and matches go three. An incredible 14 of Hubi’s 32 three-setters went to a sudden-death tiebreak. He won ten of them.

None of this is sustainable. In one sense, that’s bad news: If Hurkacz somehow lands in 14 more deciding-set tiebreaks this year, he’ll end up closer to 7-7 than 10-4. On the other hand, three-set stats are just trivia–exhausting trivia, at that. There wasn’t much to separate his top-line 2022 and 2023 results, and he’s surely be happy with another top-ten finish regardless of whether he needs to play 30-plus deciding sets to get there.

If Hubi does force so many third sets, is he likely to keep winning so many? That’s a more complicated question.

What is a good three-set record?

This is a great example of what’s missing from the tennis discourse. People talk about three-set records all the time, especially on broadcasts whenever two players head for a deciding set. We expect that top players win more one-set shootouts than journeymen do, but how many more? For a fringe top-tenner like Hurkacz, is 62.5% good? Great? Boringly in line with expectations?

What makes this tricky is that, anecdotally, there are so many different types of three-setters. Last year, Hurkacz went three with four different players ranked outside the top 100. We’d expect him to win those; it’s a bit disappointing he didn’t win them even more quickly. Hubi also went to three deciders against a number one: two with Carlos Alcaraz, one with Novak Djokovic. We wouldn’t expect him to win those (and he didn’t), but simply taking a set is a moral victory. Any list of 32 three-setters is going to include a bunch of matches that should never have gotten that far. There might be 32 different levels of expectations, if we want to break it down that far.

We don’t need to make it that complicated. What I want is a shorthand way of looking at a player’s three-set record and knowing whether he’s likely to keep it up.

It turns out that you get pretty close with a simple formula. Tour regulars–defined here as players with at least 50 ATP main-draw matches in a season–tend to win between 50% and 60% of their third-set deciders. (On average, they clean up against lower-ranked players with less time on tour, as you’d probably expect.) We can estimate what a player’s three-set record “should” be as follows:

Three-set win% = 45% + (20% * Two-set win%)

That’s it. A player’s winning percentage in straight-set matches is a decent approximation of their current level: While it’s possible to luck into a two-set victory, it’s unusual. Here’s what the model implies as likely three-set records at various skill levels:

Two-set W%  Three-set W%  
40%                52.9%  
50%                54.9%  
60%                56.9%  
70%                58.8%
80%                60.8%

Three-set records are rarely so extreme as two-set records. Djokovic, for instance, went 20-2 (!) in two-setters last year. The model predicts that he would win 63% of his three-setters. In reality he went 11-4 (73%), outperforming the estimate but still coming in much closer to 50%, as logic would suggest. Three-setters tend to occur between more closely-matched players, and once the outcome comes down to a single set, luck plays a larger part. Deciding sets aren’t as coin-flippy as tiebreaks, but as Hurkacz’s 14 third-set shootouts remind us, the margins can be equally slim.

So, back to Hubi. Last year, he won 70% of his two-setters. A typical performance for a player like that would be a three-set winning percentage of 58.8%–a 19-13 record in deciders instead of his actual 20-12. Odd as his 2023 season was, he won the close ones about as often as he should have. Even if luck turns against him, he could finagle another top-ten finish with a stronger performance at the majors–but that’s a subject for another day.

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Torben Ulrich (1928-2023)

Torben Ulrich in 1957

In 1955, Torben Ulrich invited a couple of visiting South African tennis players, Gordon Forbes and Abe Segal, to come see his band at a jazz club in Copenhagen. Ulrich, manning the clarinet chair, sat out the first several numbers. Forbes wanted to see his friend in action and encouraged him to join in.

“I must wait,” Ulrich said, “until something happens inside me. So far nothing very much has happened.”

The red-headed, bearded Dane died last month at the age of 95. In his near-century on earth, a whole lot happened. Yet he always operated on his own timetable. He once walked off the court when an opponent wouldn’t stop lobbing. (“I had asked him nicely several times to stop it, but he told me to mind my own business.”) Gene Scott told another story:

There was this recent time in Richmond. There was this girl who was wearing a very short miniskirt. The whole house, including the players, could not keep their eyes off of her. Now, Torben is getting ready to serve when he suddenly freezes in midair, then walks over to the stands. Everybody is wondering where he’s going. He stops behind the girl and quickly drops a ball down her back. I know of no other player who has ever coped with a distraction in such a gentle, colorful way.

Forbes recalled a club member who was impatient for Ulrich to vacate a practice court:

‘Have you been playing long?’ [the member] said.

‘As long as I can remember,’ said Torben.

‘How much longer will you play?’ asked the member.

‘We may go on for many years,’ said Torben.

Ulrich did, indeed, go on for many years. He won his first tournament, the Danish Nationals, in 1948, when he was 19 years old. Three years later he picked up his first international singles title in Antwerp. He remained capable of top-level tennis for another two decades after that.

“Over the years, it seems he has never lost the key,” a fellow player told Sports Illustrated in 1969, when Torben was 40 years old. “When it looks like he is ready to come apart, he comes up with that one big match. He remains respectable.”

Ulrich was never a top-tenner; he failed to reach the quarter-finals of a major in 43 tries. Yet he piled up dozens of smaller tournament victories in singles, doubles, and mixed. He contested over 100 Davis Cup rubbers for Denmark, many of them alongside his younger brother, Jørgen.

The Dane was perhaps more at home in the world of art. At various times, he wrote poetry and music criticism, painted, and made films. This side of him had a greater influence on his legacy. His son, Lars, was a promising junior tennis player, but he was probably made the right decision when he shifted his focus to music and co-founded the band Metallica.

Torben, it seemed, was as happy with one pursuit as any other. He was a seeker–it didn’t much matter what. Tennis, with its whirlwind schedule and ever-changing mix of fellow-travelers, fit the bill.

He didn’t care about results. Once, he told Forbes that he didn’t win. “I simply played in the usual way,” he said. “It was my opponent who lost.”

Perhaps Ulrich’s career-best result came at the 1968 US Open, where he upset 15th seed Marty Riessen before falling to John Newcombe in a fourth-round nailbiter, 5-7, 4-6, 6-4, 10-8, 6-4. Newk’s serve could overpower a much younger man, but it was no match for Torben’s mind. “What is speed?” he mused. “If I am concentrating properly, really seeing, a big serve will be coming at me in slow motion.”

The match could have gone either way. At a crucial moment, Ulrich flubbed an easy volley when a butterfly darted in front of his face. Was he distracted? He silenced the press with a question of his own: “Was I then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or am I now a butterfly dreaming I am a man?”

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What is this?

After the Tennis 128 in 2022 and 1973 Redux last year, my plan is to return to contemporary tennis, with the usual hefty dose of analytics.

My goal is to write as much as possible about the game between the white lines, as opposed to forecasts, ratings, previews, business, and–heaven forbid–tennis personalities and politics.

I will also continue to look back to events from 50 years ago–and 100, and perhaps the occasional non-round number. 1974 was every bit as fascinating a season as 1973. I won’t do 100-plus installments, as I did last year, but I’ll revisit various pivotal moments as their anniversaries roll around, especially to commemorate the birth of World Team Tennis this summer.

You can expect to find a new post a couple of times a week, probably more often during the majors. Your suggestions for topics are always welcome. Comments are open (provisionally! I cannot emphasize enough how provisionally!), and I’ll add a “suggestion box” to the sidebar one of these days.

If you want to keep up with everything I’m doing here, please subscribe. Links to new article will also appear on the Tennis Abstract home page. I can’t promise I’ll always post links on Twitter.

Happy new year!

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The Most Exclusive Clubs In Tennis

The new Big Two?

Tireless podcaster Alex Gruskin likes to talk about what he calls the “top-ten, top-15, top-20, and top-25 clubs.” He works out the membership of each one by consulting the Tennis Abstract ATP and WTA stats leaderboards, which display dozens of metrics for each of the top 50 ranked players on both tours.

To qualify for Alex’s “top ten club,” a player needs to be in the top ten in both hold percentage and break percentage–in other words, to be an elite server and returner. Even cracking the top 25 club is no easy task. In 2023, only 11 men were better than half of the top 50 on both sides of the ball. It’s more common to excel at one or the other. In 2022, the best returner (Diego Schwartzman) ranked 50th out of 50 on serve, and the best server (Nick Kyrgios) came in 40th on return.

The top-25 club is a high standard, and the top-ten club is a stratospheric one. This year, only three men–Novak Djokovic, Jannik Sinner, and Carlos Alcaraz–made the cut, and Alcaraz almost missed it, ranking 10th in hold percentage. Daniil Medvedev almost qualified, but he trailed Alcaraz by 0.7% in hold percentage and came in 11th in that category.

Three top-ten clubbers is, as it turns out, an unusual showing. In the 33 seasons for which we have the necessary stats to calculate hold and break percentage (back to 1991), only 13 men have ever managed the feat. Many of them did it several times, so there are a total of 49 player-seasons that qualify. For the two-plus decades between 1991 and 2011, there were only two seasons in which more than one player reached both top-ten thresholds. In 1992, the entire tour fell short.

By “club” standards (and most others), Djokovic’s 2023 season was particularly impressive. Alex usually classifies players into round-number clubs, occasionally giving credit to a near-miss who makes, for instance, the “top 26” club. We can extend the concept a bit further and place every season into its best possible club: If a player ranks in the top three by both hold and break percentage, he’s in the “top-three” club; if he ranks among the top four in both, he’s in the “top-four club,” and so on.

In 2023, Novak led the tour in hold percentage and was bested by only Alcaraz and Medvedev in break percentage. Thus, he’s a member of the top-three club. More exclusive categories are hard to find. Here’s the complete list of top-three clubbers since 1991, along with their ranks in hold percentage (H% Rk) and break percentage (B% Rk):

Year  Player          H% Rk  B% Rk  CLUB  
2023  Novak Djokovic      1      3     3  
1999  Andre Agassi        3      1     3  
1995  Andre Agassi        3      3     3  

That’s it.

Sinner’s 2023 campaign was also sneakily great. He finished a deceptive fourth on the official ATP points table, but by ranking fifth in hold percentage and fourth in break percentage, he joined an absurdly elite group of top-five clubbers: only Djokovic, Agassi, Rafael Nadal, and Roger Federer.

Here’s the full list of top-ten club seasons since 1991:

Year  Player            H% Rk  B% Rk  CLUB  
2023  Novak Djokovic        1      3     3  
1999  Andre Agassi          3      1     3  
1995  Andre Agassi          3      3     3  
2021  Novak Djokovic        4      3     4  
2013  Rafael Nadal          4      1     4  
2008  Rafael Nadal          4      1     4  
2002  Andre Agassi          4      3     4  
2023  Jannik Sinner         5      4     5  
2019  Rafael Nadal          5      1     5  
2017  Rafael Nadal          5      2     5  
2015  Novak Djokovic        5      1     5  
2014  Novak Djokovic        5      2     5  
2012  Rafael Nadal          5      1     5  
2007  Rafael Nadal          5      2     5  
2006  Roger Federer         2      5     5  
2003  Andre Agassi          5      3     5  
                                            
Year  Player            H% Rk  B% Rk  CLUB  
2022  Novak Djokovic        6      4     6  
2013  Novak Djokovic        6      2     6  
2021  Daniil Medvedev       7      4     7  
2020  Rafael Nadal          7      2     7  
2019  Novak Djokovic        7      2     7  
2012  Novak Djokovic        7      2     7  
2011  Novak Djokovic        7      1     7  
2010  Rafael Nadal          2      7     7  
2008  Novak Djokovic        7      4     7  
2004  Roger Federer         2      7     7  
2021  Alexander Zverev      8      7     8  
2020  Daniil Medvedev       8      8     8  
2018  Novak Djokovic        8      5     8  
2016  Novak Djokovic        8      2     8  
2015  Roger Federer         4      8     8  
2005  Roger Federer         2      8     8  
2001  Andre Agassi          8      3     8  
1998  Marcelo Rios          8      2     8  
1991  Stefan Edberg         4      8     8  
                                            
Year  Player            H% Rk  B% Rk  CLUB  
2022  Daniil Medvedev       8      9     9  
2020  Andrey Rublev         9      5     9  
2018  Rafael Nadal          9      1     9  
2017  Roger Federer         2      9     9  
2009  Andy Murray           9      2     9  
2007  Roger Federer         3      9     9  
2000  Andre Agassi          8      9     9  
2023  Carlos Alcaraz       10      1    10  
2020  Novak Djokovic       10      4    10  
2019  Roger Federer         3     10    10  
2013  Roger Federer         7     10    10  
1998  Andre Agassi         10      3    10  
1994  Andre Agassi         10      5    10  
1993  Thomas Muster        10      4    10

The list is heavily weighted toward the Big Three and the current era. Whether it’s surface speed convergence or something about the players themselves, it’s tougher to reach the top with a lopsided game these days. Stefan Edberg was a top-eight clubber in 1991 (and might have been as good for several seasons before that), but Pete Sampras didn’t get anywhere close. His best showing by this metric came in 1997, when he cracked the top-14 club. Andy Roddick never even cleared the top 30.

Finally, here are the 15 men who reached both top-30 thresholds in 2023:

Year  Player            H% Rk  B% Rk  CLUB  
2023  Novak Djokovic        1      3     3  
2023  Jannik Sinner         5      4     5  
2023  Carlos Alcaraz       10      1    10  
2023  Daniil Medvedev      11      2    11  
2023  Andrey Rublev        17     11    17  
2023  Karen Khachanov      18     16    18  
2023  Alexander Zverev     15     18    18  
2023  Grigor Dimitrov      19     15    19  
2023  Taylor Fritz          6     19    19  
2023  Casper Ruud          21     17    21  
2023  Holger Rune          20     21    21  
2023  Frances Tiafoe        9     26    26  
2023  Ugo Humbert          29     23    29  
2023  Roman Safiullin      30     24    30  
2023  Sebastian Korda      14     30    30

Women’s clubs

The WTA gets the short shrift on topics like these, because much less historical data is available. I only have the necessary stats back to 2015, and even that season is incomplete.

Still, that doesn’t make some recent individual performances any less impressive. Iga Swiatek’s effort in 2023 predictably stands out: She came in third behind Aryna Sabalenka and Caroline Garcia in hold percentage, and she trailed only Sara Sorribes Tormo and Lesia Tsurenko in break percentage. By finishing third in both categories, she–like Djokovic–is a member of the top-three club.

Depending on how you define a full-season, Iga might be the first ever woman to reach such a standard, at least in the nine-year span for which we can do the math. Here is the full list of top-ten clubbers back to 2015:

Year  Player             H% Rk  B% Rk  CLUB  
2016  Victoria Azarenka      2      1     2  
2023  Iga Swiatek            3      3     3  
2022  Iga Swiatek            5      1     5  
2019  Serena Williams        1      6     6  
2015  Serena Williams        1      7     7  
2016  Serena Williams        1      8     8  
2016  Angelique Kerber      10      6    10 

Azarenka’s run in 2016 was really a partial season: She hurt her knee and didn’t play again after retiring from her first-round match at the French. Her first four months of tennis put her on the path toward a historic campaign, but we’ll never know how it would have turned out. Those 29 matches can’t really be set along the same measuring stick as Iga’s 75-plus in each of the last two years. Serena’s three entries on this table were almost as abbreviated, but again we’re reminded of the limited data. Surely the list would be much longer, with many more instances of the Williams name, if we had better data.

Anyway, all hail the great Iga. May her reign last until Sabalenka figures out how to become a top-ten returner.

At least this year, it was slightly harder to crack the top-25 and top-30 clubs in the women’s game than it was in the men’s. Here is the full 2023 women’s list down to the top-32 threshold, which allows us to include a few names of interest who missed out on the top 30:

Year  Player               H% Rk  B% Rk  CLUB  
2023  Iga Swiatek              3      3     3  
2023  Cori Gauff              13      8    13  
2023  Jessica Pegula          16      5    16  
2023  Madison Keys             6     16    16  
2023  Barbora Krejcikova      12     18    18  
2023  Victoria Azarenka       19     17    19  
2023  Aryna Sabalenka          1     20    20  
2023  Marketa Vondrousova     22      6    22  
2023  Karolina Muchova         8     22    22  
2023  Leylah Fernandez        20     27    27  
2023  Jelena Ostapenko        28     12    28  
2023  Marie Bouzkova          29     21    29  
2023  Caroline Dolehide       23     30    30  
2023  Elina Svitolina         31     24    31  
2023  Beatriz Haddad Maia     18     31    31  
2023  Ons Jabeur              32      9    32  
2023  Belinda Bencic           5     32    32

More than ever, a well-rounded game is a necessity for players who hope to reach the top. For fans, “clubs” like these are a useful way to think about which stars are getting the job done on both sides of the ball.

* * *

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Epilogue: December 1873

Jimmy Connors and Chris Evert with their 1974 Wimbledon trophies

There was no single moment when the 1973 season officially ended and 1974 began. The tennis calendar was more of a perpetual cycle than a series of set campaigns. By the time Australia defeated the United States to reclaim the Davis Cup, preliminary ties in the 1974 competition were already in the books. When Ilie Năstase put the icing on his Grand Prix season with a victory at the elite Masters tournament, Australian Open warmups were in progress Down Under.

After the Australian Open, most of the world’s top players would head to North America, where the competing circuits had, for the most part, set aside their differences. Men would play World Championship Tennis and women would compete on the Virginia Slims tour. Unlike in 1973, Chris Evert would test her mettle against Billie Jean King, Rosie Casals, and the rest of the gang, and not just at the majors.

In the ongoing battle between tradition and made-for-television modernity, both sides tended to focus on money. Everyone’s bank balance looked better when the circuit headed for the biggest markets in the richest countries, especially if a TV network was interested in the rights. As the amateur ethic drifted further into the past, tournaments were less likely to be hosted at venerable clubs, more likely to be wedged into the calendar at arenas with artificial surfaces laid down a few days before the talent arrived. The traditionalists had fought for decades to preserve the old ways; now, their defeat was total.

One of the casualties was mixed doubles. What used to be a weekly feature was increasingly a novelty in a world where the tours rarely intersected. For 1963, my records include mixed doubles events at 215 tournaments around the world. A decade later, the number was down to 23, many of which were amateur events far off the beaten track of the major circuits.

The Riggs-King Battle of the Sexes symbolized a lot of things, perhaps none more than this: The genders now played against each other, not side by side.

* * *

That was not what Major Walter Clopton Wingfield had in mind.

In December 1973, the sport marked one hundred years since Major Wingfield first tried out “Sphairistiké,” the game he invented that would become known as lawn tennis. In 1873, Britain’s upper classes were mad for sports and games. Wingfield aimed to create a game that men and women could play together, more active than croquet and less vulnerable to a windy day than the newly faddish badminton.

As lawn tennis spread across the globe, many of Wingfield’s innovations, like his hourglass-shaped court, were set aside. But the notion of a mildly strenuous activity that mixed the genders was one of the keys to its success. Matches could be arranged in any conceivable permutation–Wingfield even imagined teams of three or four players on each side of the court–and competitors soon worked out ways to even the odds. Eighty-plus years before Riggs-King, early champions such as Blanche Bingley Hillyard and Lottie Dod competed against men, starting each game with a two- or three-point advantage.

Tournaments, back then, were social events, for players as much as for spectators. While mixed doubles was treated as a light-hearted pursuit compared to the more serious singles and men’s doubles, the most accomplished men and women usually took part. Fans loved it. It sometimes figured in courtships, as well: Even in the 1970s, the number of couples in the tennis world was a reminder of the amateur-era joint tournaments of the decade before. John Newcombe, Roy Emerson, and Cliff Drysdale all married veterans of the circuit. (It was also a small world: Emerson’s sister married Davis Cupper Mal Anderson, and Drysdale’s brother-in-law was doubles specialist and memoirist Gordon Forbes.) Even as opportunities dried up, the genders continued to mix: Stan Smith would soon wed Princeton standout Marjorie Gengler, and tabloid favorites Chris Evert and Jimmy Connors planned nuptials as well.

The new economics of tennis didn’t support old-school garden parties, and players of both genders eagerly made the sacrifice to chase after record prize money. Still, the public wanted mixed doubles, and promoters tried to give it to them.

* * *

A few days after Connors and Evonne Goolagong clinched titles at the 1974 Australian Open, a brand-new tennis concept appeared on North American televisions. Spalding sponsored the International Mixed Doubles Championship, an eight-team event with a prize pool of $60,000. The winning team would take home $20,000: ten grand apiece.

“Heterosexual tennis has come out of the closet,” cracked Bud Collins.

The event was a success, pleasing both players and fans at the Moody Coliseum in Dallas, Texas. King and her usual mixed partner, Owen Davidson, took first place with a best-of-five-set victory over Casals and Marty Riessen. Simply reaching the final was an achievement: Other names in the field included Rod Laver, Nancy Richey, and doubles whiz Françoise Dürr.

(Laver wasn’t known as a mixed expert, but between 1959 and 1962, he won three majors and another six titles with Darlene Hard. Her first words to the untested youngster: “I’ll serve first and take the overheads.”)

“I loved to play mixed,” King said. “The millions of ordinary players, the hackers, can relate with mixed–or any kind of doubles–because that’s mainly what they play. Often mixed is a lot more interesting and exciting for spectators than singles. The ball’s in action more. The attendance at this tournament, and the TV prove there’s a market for mixed.”

It wasn’t just Spalding that was willing to make that bet. World Team Tennis, slated to begin play in May 1974, was built on the same premise. Each squad would feature both men and women, and doubles matches–included mixed–would have as much weight as one-on-one competition. When the Minnesota Buckskins faced the Philadelphia Freedoms, Davidson, player-coach for Minnesota, would find himself in an unfamiliar and unenviable position: across the net from Freedoms star Billie Jean.

Major Wingfield would barely have known his own invention in the tennis world of 1974. The courts had straightened out, the nets had come down, and rackets had evolved beyond recognition. The sport featured millionaire players, tournaments on six continents, and a 55-year-old man who walked like a duck but had somehow captivated a nation. Still, Wingfield would have picked out glimmers of what made lawn tennis a 19th-century sensation: Men and women playing alongside one another, joking, bickering, and–every once in a while–falling in love.

* * *

This post concludes my 128-part series about the 1973 season, Battles, Boycotts, and Breakouts. Read the whole thing by checking the TennisAbstract.com front page, which shows the full Table of Contents.

In 2024, I’ll be writing regularly about analytics and contemporary tennis, with some history thrown in. Subscribe to receive each new post by email:

 

December 15, 1973: Court Adjourned

Margaret Court with son Danny

Clearly something wasn’t quite right. Margaret Court was the most overwhelming force in women’s tennis since Maureen Connolly. She had won over 100 matches in 1973, and all four of her losses went three sets. At the 1973 Western Australian Championships in Perth, she was going for her 12th career title at the event.

On December 15th, she met countrywoman Kerry Harris in the semi-final. Harris, like everyone else, hadn’t had much luck against Court, taking only one set in nine previous meetings. She had little reason to hope for more this time: She had arrived in Perth on a four-match losing streak. Court, for her part, had won her first three matches at the tournament with the loss of only five total games.

The first sign that this would end differently came in the third game, when Harris broke for a 2-1 advantage. Court responded in kind but didn’t make any further progress. Only when the first set reached 5-5 did someone crack, and to the astonishment of the Perth crowd, it was the 11-time champion. Harris took the last two games for the set. The second set followed a similar script: Eight holds of serve, then another Harris breakthrough to seal the unlikely result, 7-5, 6-4.

The full story emerged the following week. Margaret Court, already the mother of a 21-month-old son, was pregnant. Her second child was due in July, and she would step away from the tour immediately. It was a blow to the Bonne Bell Cup–a fledgling international women’s competition between Australia and the United States, to be held later in December–as well as to the Australian Open itself.

Court’s absence, of course, was an opportunity for the players she had shut out for so long. Evonne Goolagong not only grabbed the Western Australian title; she also saw her chances of victory skyrocket at the big event in Melbourne. Another beneficiary, in the slightly longer term, was Billie Jean King. King skipped the Australian swing, having made enormous financial demands of the Bonne Bell Cup that organizers ultimately weren’t able to meet. But while Madame Superstar had recently talked about focusing on other parts of her life, she would return, revitalized and ferociously motivated, to the Virginia Slims tour in January. With Court out of the way, King would be the dominant player on the 1974 indoor circuit.

While Billie Jean would keep the youngsters in check for another year, Court’s exit marked the beginning of the end of an era. Margaret would return in November 1974 only to lose an Australian Open quarter-final to Martina Navratilova. (She did, however, pick up that 12th career title in Perth.) She never made another major final, and further pregnancies soon led her into a more permanent retirement. King would last longer–she won tournaments and made the Wimbledon semis as late as 1983–but after 1974, she, too, was essentially a part-timer, putting World Team Tennis and myriad other pursuits ahead of the traditional tour. The field was open for Navratilova and Chris Evert to forge new dynasties.

Court’s pregnancy closed another door, as well: Bobby Riggs’s lingering hope of a rematch. The first Battle of the Sexes, back in May, had been the one blotch on the Australian’s remarkable season, and Riggs saw dollar signs in an encore. Billie Jean had refused him, and negotiations with the Goolagong and Evert camps went nowhere. With Court unavailable, Riggs, too, faded into the history books.

* * *

This post is part of my series about the 1973 season, Battles, Boycotts, and Breakouts. Keep up with the project by checking the TennisAbstract.com front page, which shows an up-to-date Table of Contents after I post each installment.

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Predicting Next Year’s Elo Ratings

I often illustrate the difference between Elo ratings and the traditional ATP and WTA ranking-point systems as follows: The official rankings tell you how good a player was six months ago. Elo estimates where they are today. For the purposes of tournament entry and so on, a 52-week average makes sense. But if you’re predicting the outcome of tomorrow’s match, you don’t want to assign the same weight to a year-old result that you give to yesterday’s news.

That said, Elo ratings are not explicitly predictive. They rely only on past results. They don’t recognize the fact that a player on a hot streak will probably cool off, or that a younger player is more likely to improve than an older one. If we want to look further ahead than tomorrow’s match, we need to take some of those additional factors into account.

Hence today’s project: Projecting Elo ratings one year in advance. Elo ratings tend to be a leading indicator of official rankings, so if we can get some idea of a player’s future in Elo terms, we can estimate–very approximately, I admit–his or her ATP or WTA ranking even further out.

I kept things simple. Each player’s forecast is based on four variables: Age, current Elo rating, rating one year ago, and rating two years ago. Current rating is by far the most important consideration. It accounts for over 70% of the men’s forecast and 80% of the women’s. Everything else is essentially a tweak. The two older ratings allow the forecast to make adjustments if the current rating is an outlier. By including player age, we account for the fact that players over 25 or 26 start–on average!–to decline, and the older they are, the sharper the decline.

Take Novak Djokovic as an example. His current Elo rating is 2,227, one year ago it was 2,145, and two years ago it was 2,186. Because his 2023 year-end rating was higher than 2021 or 2022, we’d expect a small step backwards. And because he’s 36 years old, the laws of physics might eventually slow him down. Put it all together, and the model projects his 2024 year-end Elo at 2,116. Excellent, but slightly more human, and a number that would’ve placed him third on this year’s list.

Here is what the model predicts as the 2024 year-end top ten:

Rank  Player              2024 Elo  2023 Rank  2023 Elo  
1     Jannik Sinner           2144          2      2197  
2     Carlos Alcaraz          2137          3      2149  
3     Novak Djokovic          2116          1      2227  
4     Daniil Medvedev         2059          4      2104  
5     Alexander Zverev        2021          5      2024  
6     Andrey Rublev           1988          6      2020  
7     Stefanos Tsitsipas      1969          9      1974  
8     Holger Rune             1954         12      1936  
9     Hubert Hurkacz          1950          8      1983  
10    Grigor Dimitrov         1928          7      2011

As precise as that table looks, it is hard to predict the future. Here are the same ten players, with a 95% prediction interval shown:

The intervals demonstrate just how uncertain we are, with 12 months of tennis to play. If Jannik Sinner or Carlos Alcaraz hits the high end of his range, in the mid-2,300s, he’ll have established himself as a runaway number one. But if they surprise in the other direction, they’ll land below 2,000 and just barely stay in the top ten. Even these intervals don’t quite account for all the unknowns. There’s a nonzero chance that any of these guys will get hurt and miss most of the season, leaving them off the 2024 year-end list entirely.

I suspect, also, that a more sophisticated model would give a different range of outcomes for Djokovic. There are few precedents for his level of play at age 36, and he outperformed expectations in 2023. Had we run this model a year ago, it would’ve predicted a 2,071 Elo for him now. He beat that by more than 150 points, landing around the 85th percentile of the projection. But time is cruel. Since 1980, five out of six 36-year-olds have seen their Elo decline from the previous season. The average year-over-year change–including those few players who gained–is a loss of 45 points. It’s hard to bet against Djokovic, but at this point in his career, his downside almost certainly exceeds his upside.

Finally, let’s take a look at the projected 2024 top ten on the women’s side. It’s not nearly as juicy as the men’s forecast, as it barely differs from the 2023 list. As I mentioned above, a player’s current rating is a bigger factor in the forecast than it is for men–age is less of a factor, and if a player’s rating jumps around from year to year, women are more likely to stay at their current level than bounce back to a previous one. The forecast:

Rank  Player               2024 Elo  2023 Rank  2023 Elo  
1     Iga Swiatek              2197          1      2237  
2     Cori Gauff               2100          2      2127  
3     Aryna Sabalenka          2062          3      2099  
4     Jessica Pegula           2035          4      2089  
5     Elena Rybakina           2024          5      2059  
6     Marketa Vondrousova      1977          8      2005  
7     Ons Jabeur               1976          7      2007  
8     Karolina Muchova         1965          6      2014  
9     Qinwen Zheng             1961          9      2000  
10    Liudmila Samsonova       1938         11      1959

You might have noticed in both the ATP and WTA lists that most ratings–at least for top-tenners–are projected to go down. There’s a small regression component in the model, meaning that every player is expected to pull a bit back toward the middle of the pack. That doesn’t mean they will, of course, but on average, that’s what happens.

Here are the prediction intervals for the women’s top ten:

The magnitude of the intervals is about the same as it was for the men. Iga Swiatek could launch into a peak-Serena-like stratosphere, or she could, conceivably, land at the fringes of the top ten. Liudmila Samsonova, bringing up the end of this list, might challenge for a place in the top three, or she could be scrambling to stay in the top 50.

One thing is certain: The 2024 year-end lists won’t actually look like this. The value of this sort of forecast, even when it is so approximate, lies in the context it gives us. A year from now, we’ll be talking about which players outperformed or underperformed their expectations. Projections like these help us pin down what, exactly, was a reasonable expectation in the first place.

* * *

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