Where Should You Hit An Approach Shot?

To the backhand, obviously. Or is it down-the-line, to cut down angles? Or maybe mix things up, so the opponent won’t start leaning the right way. Should the advice be the same for men and women?

Start with the basics. For the ATP, looking at all forehand, backhand, and backhand slice approach shots (excluding serve-and-volleys and net-rushes on returns), the Match Charting Project gives us over 84,000 data points since 2020. About 96% of approach shots land in the court. Of those, a bit more than one-third end the point immediately, either as winners or opponent errors. If the approach shot comes back, the net player wins 58.6% of the time. Altogether, when an ATPer hits an approach shot, he wins the point 70% of the time.

Of course, not all approaches are created equal.

Here are men’s approaches broken down by direction:

Direction  Share   Ends   Won%  
To FH      31.9%  37.4%  70.9%  
Middle      5.8%  23.9%  53.7%  
To BH      62.3%  30.8%  70.8%

Men overwhelmingly aim for the backhand. Approaches to the forehand are more likely to end the point immediately, but if the point goes longer, the netman fares better against the backhand. Apart from the weak results down the middle, we seem to have landed on a good balance. Maybe to-the-backhand is better against a naive opponent, but pros lean that way, knowing it’s the likely shot. To-the-forehands need to be better: ATPers miss those a bit more often, and judging from the winner/induced-error rates, those land closer to the lines.

If the forehand/backhand balance is an example of a well-executed mixed strategy, those down-the-middle approaches are … something else. The relatively poor results probably stem in part from circumstance. Players can be stranded in no-man’s land and hit an approach for a lack of decent options–those approaches are probably more likely to go down the middle. Apart from desperation shots, maybe there’s some benefit in an occasional approach at the feet, just to complicate the opponent’s guessing game. In any case, the down-the-middle share (under 6%) suggests that players know that approaches should usually go elsewhere.

The overall trends for women are similar. To-the-backhand is somewhat more successful (68.9% to 66.4% in overall win percentage), and down-the-middle approaches are even less so, at 49.6%.

What about the geometry?

All else equal, it’s best to approach from the middle, though it’s only slightly better than coming forward from the forehand corner. (For men: 70.8% win percentage to 70.3%, compared to 66.5% from the backhand corner.)

Down-the-line approaches make life harder for the opponent, but they are higher-risk. More errors, more winners, and mixed outcomes overall. For men, a down-the-line forehand approach beats a cross-court forehand approach by 1.7 percentage points. Among backhands, the risks and rewards cancel each other out. For women, there’s no net advantage from either wing.

If you’re in a corner, the important thing is to avoid approaching to the middle. You probably already figured that out, given the overall numbers. From a corner, the results are even worse. When men approach down the middle from a corner, they win only 50.8% of points. For women, it’s just 47.7%. Again, a lot of that disadvantage is situational. But that doesn’t mean it’s a good idea if you have a choice.

What about shot selection?

Forehands > backhands > backhand slices. Topspin backhand approaches are better than I would have guessed: ATPers coming in off the backhand win 67.9% of points, compared to 71.8% on forehands.

Slice approaches are a modern-game disaster. Once upon a time, slice approaches were a centerpiece of aggressive playing styles, hence the term “chip and charge” and all those graceful highlight-reel shots of Martina Navratilova and Pete Sampras. Now, baseline play is just too good. Men win barely half (50.4%) of backhand-slice approaches. As with down-the-middle approaches, some of that probably stems from net-rushing in suboptimal circumstances. But that’s doesn’t explain nearly all of it. Presumably slice approaches are better on fast surfaces, especially low-bouncing grass, than this dire average. Competitors themselves, though, are increasingly skeptical. Barely one in five backhand-side approaches are slices, as players tire of watching passing shots sail by.

(Edit! Presumably, you say? I got around to checking it. On grass, men’s slice approaches end up winning the point 53.6% of the time. Better than average, still not very good. For women, slice approaches have the same outcomes on grass as elsewhere.)

The shot-type breakdown is almost identical for women. WTAers win 68% of forehand approaches, 66.2% of topspin backhands, and 45.6% of backhand slice approaches.

Context matters

Major factors that I haven’t addressed–and can’t with any precision, given Match Charting Project data–are court position and quality of the previous shot. Clearly these things matter: Regardless of shot selection or direction, an approach has a better chance of success from inside the baseline against a weak reply than it does from behind the baseline against a Jannik Sinner cannonball.

One simple proxy for these factors is rally stage. More than half of men’s approach shots in the dataset occur on the third shot of the rally: the plus-one shot. On average, this is the best opportunity to come forward, as there’s only so much the returner can do with the return.

Here’s how those compare to subsequent stages of the rally:

Stage    Share   Ends   Won%  
shot 3   50.4%  33.9%  72.1%  
shot 4    9.4%  31.1%  65.8%  
shot 5+  40.2%  31.0%  68.0% 

A plus-one approach is rarely an awkward shot. Barring a net-cord or unexpected bounce, servers will only pounce on that next shot when the circumstances favor it. So while 72% isn’t quite the win rate for an approach shot when everything is set up just right, it’s pretty close. Net-rushers will always make errors, opponents will always come up with low-percentage passes made good, and so on. Still, by the standard of tennis’s small margins, a win rate in the 70s is huge.

Women don’t show quite the same splits. They win 67.7% of plus-one approaches, then 65.3% on fourth shots and the same 65.3% for everything beyond that. The serve doesn’t set up plus-one approaches to the same degree.

Try to distill all this to some simple advice, and you might end up with something generic like “pick your spots.” While not terribly helpful, it is true: Context probably matters more than forehand-versus-backhand or down-the-line-versus-cross-court.

As for concrete tips: If you’re forced to hit an approach up the middle, maybe don’t approach, unless the alternatives are even worse. And if you don’t need to go up the middle, hit your approach somewhere else. Anywhere else!

How Long Does Return Quality Matter?

A deep return is better than a shallow one. A return to a corner is better than one down the middle. There’s no doubt that return placement matters, but how long does it matter?

With every shot after the return, it is logical that the effect of the return would decay. A strong return might not go for a winner, but it probably induces a weak reply, making it more likely that the returner can end the point on her next shot. But if she doesn’t, if the rally continues to 6, 10, or more shots, at some point the quality of that return is no longer a factor. Either she sacrificed the advantage it gave her, or her opponent defied the odds to get back on neutral (or better) terms.

You guessed it: We can quantify this.

Drawing on the thousands of 2020s matches logged by the Match Charting Project, let’s start with the simplest comparison: returns that landed beyond the service line versus those that landed in the service box. Deeper is unquestionably better: For men, a back-half return means winning the point 50% of the time, while an in-the-box return is good for only 41.4%. Even controlling for match (opponent, surface, etc), the difference is 7.7 percentage points.

Most of that advantage shows up in just a few shots after the return. These plots show the percentage-point advantage of a deeper return at each stage of a rally:

Return depth matters more, and for longer, in the men’s game. A back-half return against a first serve is worth about 2.5 percentage points more to men than to women. Against first and second serves, return depth plays a role up to at least the eighth shot.

For women, this basic measure of return depth loses half of its predictive power once the rally reaches its fourth shot. By then, the server has either capitalized and ended the point, or she has squandered her advantage. (Or the return was good enough that she didn’t have an advantage to squander.) By the sixth shot the return is barely a factor at all: The confidence interval says the effect could be zero.

The server’s natural control of the point also explains the stair-step nature of the graph. A big part of the difference between return influence on 3-shot rallies and 4-shot rallies is that the points with the weakest returns become third-shot (plus-one) winners. There is no fourth shot. The effect is similar, if smaller, between the 5th and 6th shots as well, in some of the plots.

What about angles?

An ideal return forces the server to move away from the middle of the baseline. Intuitively, it seems like line-kissing returns affect the development of a point differently than deep ones do. To overgeneralize: If the server has to move, he could immediately be at a disadvantage. A deep return, by contrast, merely stops him from putting the point away.

The next set of plots show the difference between down-the-middle returns and crosscourt returns. (That is, crosscourt to the ~third of the court closest to the opposite sideline.) For men, the difference between crosscourt and middle isn’t as great as the gap between back-half and front-half. For women, it’s about the same. The return still remains a factor until the sixth or seventh shot:

(Ignore the women’s trend lines that head back upward for long rallies. That might be a selection effect. Maybe returners who neutralize the server’s advantage are more likely to come out ahead in marathon points.)

Down-the-line returns are a little different. The biggest effect of hitting in that direction is an increase in service winners: In the next set of plots, check out the diamonds in the 2* column for second serves. That column includes all non-ace points; the other data points on the graph depend on the server putting a second ball in play:

I expected that crosscourt returns would both be better than down-the-line returns and have a longer-lasting influence. I was wrong about the first. All else equal, down-the-line returns are a bit more effective, assuming they land in. Maybe servers expect a crosscourt return and lean that way. There’s a stronger case for the second. The advantage of a down-the-line return is gone for women by the sixth shot of the rally, the seventh shot for men.

Finding the backhand

Often, the returner’s goal isn’t to hit a particular corner, it is to target the server’s weaker side. For men, especially, that side is usually the backhand. Maybe there’s a detectable advantage–and ensuing influence–in finding the server’s backhand?

The evidence says: Not really. On men’s first serves, a little bit, and it’s gone after another stroke or two. The plots tell the story:

Of course, tennis is complicated and these are descriptive statistics, not recommendations. Returners have to weigh several factors (assuming they have time to think at all), not just which wing to target. If men tried to hit more returns to the backhand side, they’d have to do so with opportunities that aren’t as well-suited to a return in that direction, and that next marginal percentage point of returns-to-the-backhand might not be as good. In that sense, seeing near-equal outcomes for returns to either wing suggests that returners have found a reasonable, if not quite optimal, balance.

What about the extremes?

So far, we’ve been looking at one variable at a time. What’s the difference between a really well-placed return and a poor one? To put it another way, how much does return location matter at the extremes, and how long does the difference persist?

We can measure that by comparing “shallow-middle” (service box, middle third of the court) with “deep-corner” (back quarter of the court, outer thirds of the court) returns. The difference is substantial–nearly 20 points of win percentage for men on both first and second serves–but it doesn’t last much, if any, longer than the other effects we’ve seen:

For women, the advantage of a very well-placed return is almost entirely gone before the sixth shot of the rally. It lasts longer for men, with the confidence interval touching zero only on the ninth shot. Still, both server and returner have just a short window in which to capitalize on a weak or strong reply.

Putting it all together: A good or bad return affects the development of the rally even after more shots have been struck. But not forever: If somebody tells you that a return set up a winner on the 12th stroke of a rally, they’re overstating the case. A good service return can accomplish a lot, but its powers are not unlimited.

Do Pushers Grow Out Of It?

Is Victoria Mboko a pusher? I was tagged in a Twitter exchange the other day debating that exact question. From watching her play, I would hardly compare her to Ostapenko, but the p-word wouldn’t have come to mind.

Rally Aggression Score puts her at +6, on a scale designed to run from -100 to +100. Based on 27 charted matches from the last 52 weeks, that makes her about neutral, tactically similar (at least along this dimension) to the likes of Belinda Bencic and Karolina Muchova. Counterpunchers, maybe, not pushers.

On the other hand, “neutral” overstates it. Lowell West devised the metric about a decade ago, and the game has changed since then. The way I initially scaled it, Petra Kvitova flirted with triple digits, and that was about it. Now, Dayana Yastremska gets close to 200. Elena Rybakina, at exactly 100 in the last year, ranks only fifth among players with at least five charted matches. There’s nothing so extreme at the other end: Emma Navarro has averaged -68, while the most passive top-tenners are Coco Gauff and Mirra Andreeva at -20 and -30, respectively.

Mboko’s +6, while hardly vintage Wilander, is indeed more passive than the average WTA player in 2026.

Aggressive growth

Will the Canadian change tactics with age? These days, it seems like nearly everyone at least tries to take more chances and hit more winners. (If you don’t, your opponent will!)

I can’t tell Mboko’s future, but I can load up a database and run queries on it.

So, different question: Do players in general change tactics with age? It’s easy to think of examples: Serena Williams got more aggressive over the years. Ostapenko (remarkably) has done the same. I’m not sure there are equally prominent players who have moved in the other direction, but it does seem like some teenagers show up bashing balls, then settle for a more measured game in their 20s.

I took all women with at least 20 charted matches, grouped their rally scores by year, and figured out how much each year’s score differed from their career norms. Average those deviations across all players, and this is what you get:

From age 18 to 36–the entirety of most players’ careers–there’s nothing to see here. Plus or minus five points of rally aggression score is a rounding error, especially since these are non-random samples based on what Match Charting Project contributors wanted to chart and could find on video.

The spike at age 37 is also not very instructive: It’s basically Serena Williams, and we already knew that as she aged, she took increasingly few prisoners. From 2007 to 2009, her average aggression score was about +20. In 2019, when she was 37, it was +109.

Still, that climb at the left end of the graph is suggestive. It doesn’t literally apply to Mboko, who is already 19. But it supports a plausible narrative. When young women–especially the youngest prospects–arrive on tour, they aren’t as strong, or perhaps even as tall, as they will soon become. (Even Lilli Tagger recently gained a centimeter.) Their experience is disproportionately against juniors, who are even less physically imposing, relative to adult pros. The typical 16-year-old, no matter how talented, isn’t going to show up on tour and play like Sabalenka.

There are exceptions, of course. Maria Sharapova’s highest single-season aggression score was in 2004, when she was 17. Madison Keys arrived on the circuit playing essentially the same game she would play for the next decade. Iga Swiatek was more aggressive at age 18 than she has been since.

On average, though, the youngest players are more conservative–fewer winners, fewer errors–than they will become as they graduate from their teens. The mechanism could well apply to a 19-year-old, too.

The trend is null

We’re always talking about how players could develop and improve, or what their new coach brings to the table. Yet the undefeated champion of tennis forecasting is the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis, of course, means that you should’ve skipped this entire post and watched a Friends rerun instead.

It is boring, but the best way to predict how a player will look next year is to point at their current results and say, “yeah, just like that.” You can fiddle around the edges and maybe find players on the cusp of something or other, but … no, usually you can’t even do that.

Here are the year-to-year aggression trends of the women with the most matches in the MCP database:

See that trendline that goes from the lower-left corner up to the upper-right? No, you don’t, because it’s not there. The closest is Serena, who dipped to +12 in her late 20s before getting hyper-aggressive in her 30s.

To answer the question posed by my headline, then: No, pushers don’t grow out of it. The style of play you see today is a good predictor of the style of play you’ll see a decade from now.

Lucky for Mboko, then, that she isn’t a pusher. Throughout her career, I’ll bet she tries a lot of new things and incorporates plenty of fresh ideas from a handful of high-profile coaches. The end result may well take her to the top of the rankings: A 19-year-old ranked 6th on the Elo table has a bright future ahead. If she finds a game that takes her all the way to the top, odds are it will look a lot like what we’ve seen so far.

What Does Felix Auger-Aliassime Do So Right On Indoor Hard Courts?

Felix Auger-Aliassime has earned a reputation as a world-beater on indoor hard courts. He’s no Jannik Sinner–as Sinner reminded him all four times they met last year, twice indoors–but FAA is a fearsome customer against just about anybody else.

Last week the Canadian added to his indoor title haul with his second-straight championship in Montpellier. This time, he straight-setted Adrian Mannarino. While that win doesn’t particularly raise any eyebrows, the body of work keeps growing. It’s his eighth career title indoors, three of them at ATP 500s. Last fall in Paris, he also reached his second Masters final. (The first was in Madrid, the indoorsiest of the clay Masters.)

What’s the secret?

The conventional wisdom is that he has a big game, especially a deadly first serve. The controlled environment indoors, plus typically fast conditions, play to his strengths. The serves skid across the court even faster. His weaknesses are mitigated because the bounce is more predictable and because points are shorter.

All that sounds plausible. My only gripe is, couldn’t you say that about a lot of players? The whole paragraph applies, almost word for word, to Hubert Hurkacz, who has two Masters crowns on outdoor hard, plus a clay title, yet just a pair of indoor 250-level championships. What about Matteo Berrettini? The description might match him even better, yet the Italian has never won a title indoors. He has reached only one indoor 250-level final.

Before we go to the numbers, let me give you my seat-of-the-pants theory. FAA has huge weapons, but he doesn’t always play like it. He doesn’t consistently swat away easy plus-ones like Berrettini does. He gets sucked into long rallies, where he’s often at the disadvantage. Indoors, though, he knows what the tactics are, and he plays the way he should play. Indoor Felix, then, is the best Felix, both because his game is suited to the conditions and because he shows up with the right approach.

On the other hand, the last two points against Mannarino on Sunday were 8- and 18-shot rallies, respectively. So, you know, don’t trust my pants.

Numbers!

You can, however, trust the spreadsheets. The Match Charting Project has well over 100 Auger-Aliassime matches. Going back to 2020, the total includes 41 on indoor hard and 40 on outdoor hard, nicely suited for some comparisons. I was tempted to throw out the seven Tour Finals matches from the indoor tallies, because they skew the quality of the opponents, but the Canadian’s indoor averages are about the same with or without them.

Start with serve stats:

Surface       Unret%  <=3 W%  RiP W%  
Indoor Hard    35.7%   47.7%   55.5%  
Outdoor Hard   32.8%   43.4%   49.7%

About three percentage points more serves don't come back, and there's an even wider gap in points polished off on the serve or plus-one (the "<=3 W%" stat). The biggest gap here is in points won when the return comes back. Sub-50% is below average, especially for hard courts. 55% or better is very good, even in fast conditions.

Almost all of the indoor/outdoor serve differences are thanks to the first serve. FAA's second-serve numbers are about the same regardless of roof status.

Of course, Felix isn't the only guy on tour who wins more easy serve points indoors. I don't have comprehensive stats on the indoor/outdoor split, so I can't tell you the exact tour average. But we can compare how much Auger-Aliassime gains on serve to how much he gives up on return:

Surface        RiP%  RiP W%  
Indoor Hard   65.3%   48.8%  
Outdoor Hard  67.5%   43.2% 

He retrieves 2.2 percentage points fewer serves indoors--better than the 2.9-percentage-point difference he gains on serve. But when he gets the serve back, he's actually better indoors than outdoors! He gains five percentage points in that department on serve, and he gains the same margin on return.

This might dovetail with the conventional wisdom. His monster serve really pays off indoors. And predictable conditions give him a bit of cover on return.

Whatever the reason, Auger-Aliassime's groundstrokes are way more effective indoors. My Potency metrics, FHP and BHP, combine winners, unforced errors, and shots that set up winners and errors. They give you one-number estimates of how valuable each shot is, and... wow:

Surface       RallyLen  FHP/100  BHP/100  
Indoor Hard        3.7     +8.5     +0.0  
Outdoor Hard       3.9     +3.2     -5.8

His indoor points are a little shorter, but I assume that is typical. I would've guessed that the difference was greater.

The Potency numbers (expressed here as rates per 100 shots), tell a more emphatic story. A +3.2 FHP/100 is ok, not great. Tommy Paul and Ugo Humbert are in that zone. On the other hand, +8.5 is the 52-week average of Carlos Alcaraz. A -5.8 BHP/100 is near the bottom of the pack, below the likes of Ben Shelton and Grigor Dimitrov. By contrast, +0.0 is, as it sounds, a good solid average.

These numbers don't drill into the "why" questions that naturally follow. But they help us pick between theories. I suspect that much of the difference in groundstroke stats has to do with the shots he gets to hit. The winners are downstream of good serves. Auger-Aliassime picks up some aces, but he picks up more plus-one (or even plus-two) winners, and those make his forehand and backhand numbers look good.

The "indoor predictability" thesis also looks good here. Remember that everybody should benefit from that--and not everybody's numbers improve like Felix's do--but it may be that the Canadian is more-than-typically exposed by the vagaries of outdoor play.

All the angles

Quick thought experiment. Picture Roger Federer hitting an ace.

Now imagine Auger-Aliassime hitting an ace.

What specific serves came to mind? If you're like me, you pictured Federer shooting a bullet right down the tee. And then you visualized FAA hitting a flat bomb out wide.

Of course, both guys hit plenty of aces in every direction. The charting stats suggest that Felix has a slightly better chance of an ace when he goes up the middle. (Federer did too, by a bigger margin, as do most players.) Still, this indoor/outdoor split caught my eye:

Surface       Deuce Wide%  Ad Wide%  BP Wide%  
Indoor Hard         50.5%     47.8%     33.7%  
Outdoor Hard        46.9%     45.2%     41.0%

Each column shows how often Auger-Aliassime opted for a wide serve in various scenarios. The first-serve differences are probably more marked, because his second-serve tendencies are about the same.

Indoor, he goes wide more often--but less often under the pressure of break point. While the margins are rather slim, it seems like the wide serve becomes his bread-and-butter indoors, and he uses the tee serve to mix things up on break point--because he's hitting more wide serves the rest of the time.

Wide serves are more likely to come back, but they don't make the returner any more likely to win the point. Especially against Felix: His signature serve might not even be an ace, but a wide bomb that the returner just barely plops back over the net.

The fact that he hits more wide serves indoors explains a lot. He gets a few more unreturned serves (as everybody does, probably), but he gains more of an advantage on the serves that (weakly, oh so weakly) come back. His groundstroke stats sparkle, padded by those easy balls.

Here's one final comparison:

Surface       2ndAgg  
Indoor Hard       +7  
Outdoor Hard     +46

"2ndAgg" is the Aggression Score stat tailored specifically to second serves. A higher score means more double faults and more unreturned second serves. Lower means fewer risks on second balls. +7 is quite conservative: Only about a dozen players consistently score so low.

But--those careful second servers include Sinner, Hurkacz, and Berrettini. With a game like Auger-Aliassime's, the second serve isn't the time to take risks. And indeed, in all of his indoor finals, he has never topped a double-fault rate of 5%. In the Montpellier final, he missed his second serve just once, and he committed no double faults at all in the quarter- and semi-finals.

Here, finally, is some support of my seat-of-the-pants theory, that when Felix goes indoors, he plays the way he ought to be playing all the time. He stays within himself, which is still imposing enough to earn a lot of cheap points. It's not a particularly complicated story, and I'm still not convinced why it doesn't apply to a half-dozen other guys on tour. Maybe it is all about the wide serve, the signature shot that allows Auger-Aliassime to manage risk and put his opponents on the back foot, all at the same time.

How Much Would a Second Forehand Be Worth?

Maybe you’ve seen the videos floating around of 13-year-old Lucas Herrera Sanchez, who hits a forehand on both sides:

The replies are fascinating. Responses run the gamut from “Why doesn’t everybody do this?” to “Switching grips will kill him.” Or my favorite: “What if he needs to hit a backhand?”

So we’re agreed: It could be the future of tennis, or it could be nothing. It isn’t completely unprecedented: Cheong-Eui Kim cracked the top 300 a decade ago, and a handful of juniors have reached an international standard for their age groups. Going way back, Beverly Baker Fleitz (#128 on my Tennis 128) took her two forehands all the way to the 1955 Wimbledon final. John Bromwich, another Wimbledon finalist, hit forehands and backhands from both sides.

And, of course, there’s a long history of teaching kids to hit forehands with their non-dominant hand. Rafael Nadal is a natural righty, while all-timers Maureen Connolly, Margaret Court, and Ken Rosewall were lefties who played right-handed. There’s no reason why any of those players couldn’t have developed two forehands instead of the one they did.

Let’s try to put some numbers on this. What’s the value of having two forehands instead of one?

Plug and play

We can’t run the counterfactual where, say, Carlos Alcaraz learns two forehands from age six. But we can work out what would happen if his backhand were exactly as effective as his forehand.

I probably don’t need to tell you that this would be an improvement for most players. We have ten-plus matches’ worth of 2025 charting-level data for 37 different men. Going by my Forehand Potency (FHP) and Backhand Potency (BHP) metrics, only three guys–Alejandro Davidovich Fokina, Daniil Medvedev, and Alexander Zverev–were more effective on the backhand side. Everybody else would’ve benefited from magically attaining forehand-level performance on both wings.

FHP and BHP tally up winners (plus forced errors), unforced errors, and shots that lead to one of those outcomes. Jannik Sinner, for instance, scores +13.2 FHP per match. Divide by 1.5 to translate to points, and Sinner’s forehand earned him about nine points per match more than a “neutral” forehand–one more like Zverev’s.

The typical tour regular grades out at 6.7 FHP and 0.6 BHP per match. That’s a difference of about six, or roughly four points. Put another way: Give the average player a backhand as effective as his forehand, and he’d win four more points per match.

Plus or minus

Four points per match. The average match runs about 140 points, so that’s a boost of nearly 3% of total points. Can you feel something dripping on you? That’s a tennis player uncontrollably salivating.

Three percentage points is huge. I once estimated that an improvement of one point in a thousand (0.1%, or one-thirtieth of 3%) was worth a single position in the rankings. That model wasn’t really designed to handle such big adjustments, so we can’t exactly say that a second forehand would be worth a 30-place ranking boost. On the other hand: Give, say, Tommy Paul four more points per match, and his point-winning rate would be as high as anyone except for Sinner. Hand the same boost to 49th-ranked Jenson Brooksby, and he’d win more points than anyone ranked outside the top six.

But. BUT. So many buts.

I don’t know about Herrera Sanchez, but I suspect that most two-forehanded players still have a weak side. Maybe the gap wouldn’t be as big as the standard forehand/backhand difference. But even with training from a young age, I doubt that the average unnatural-side forehand would be as strong as the player’s natural side forehand. I have no idea what that means for the 3% number, other than the fact that it is too high.

There’s also the issue of grip-changing. Depending on who you ask, the delay and awkwardness of switching from one forehand grip to the other either dooms the whole project, or it isn’t that big of a deal. I suspect that if a kid can learn to hit two forehands, he can figure out the grip-changing issues. Still, there is a probably a cost. (If nothing else, on return of serve. It might make sense to have a defensive backhand for first-serve returns only.) Again, I have no idea what that cost is. You give up a few more winners, but you hit better shots when you get there.

On the other other hand, simply plugging in forehand value for backhand value might in one regard understate the benefits of having two forehands! 53% of ATP groundstrokes are forehands, yet most players target their opponents’ backhands. In other words, pros are covering considerably more than half the court with their forehand. There’s a cost to that: Awkward inside-out attempts, suboptimal court position after the shot, etc. Depending on the player, I’d guess that 10% to 20% of forehands would be backhands if the forehand weren’t the better option. (For example, only 45% of Medvedev’s groundstrokes are forehands.)

The better a player’s secondary shot, whether a backhand or a weaker-hand forehand, the less often he’ll go out of position to hit a forehand. Those are some of the toughest forehands, so taking fewer of them will mean (dominant-hand) forehand potency will go up, too. As with the other complications, I have no idea how to quantify that with the data we have. It’s probably not a significant change to the number, but directionally, it mitigates some of the effect of second-forehand weakness and grip-changing.

Stepping back

While I can calculate the hypotheticals, this is ultimately a coaching and player-development question. Given a talented, motivated youngster, is it worth teaching them a second forehand instead of a backhand?

Here, I really have no clue. Maybe Herrera Sanchez will make it big. The same level of early tinkering certainly worked out for Rafa! But how often have coaches tried this? For every Rafa or Rosewall, are there ten kids who flamed out (or just gave up) early because a weaker-hand forehand was too frustrating? Or did they end up starting late with a proper backhand, never fully developing that shot? How many youngsters even have the potential to develop a powerful forehand with their non-dominant hand?

It’s hardly a magic bullet, even if a junior does manage to develop high-quality shots on both wings. While 3% of total points is huge by tennis standards, you still need 50% to win most matches. If an up-and-comer with two forehands tops out at 5-foot-9, or struggles too much with double faults, or doesn’t develop elite movement and anticipation, or comes up short on any one of a hundred more dimensions, he’ll have a hard time establishing himself on the Challenger tour, if that. “Not good enough” plus 3% is still, almost always, not good enough.

The best way to think about this, I think, is to frame the second forehand as a really, really good backhand. It isn’t exactly the same, but it’s close enough. Novak Djokovic has one, and of course it has worked out for him, because he’s historically great at all sorts of things. Benoit Paire had one: He won three titles and made an appearance inside the top 20. Elmer Møller has one, and at age 22 he’s still hunting for a top-100 debut. A non-dominant-side groundstroke of that caliber is an incredible asset, yet it’s still a small part of a winning formula.

Is developing a second forehand easier than doubling up on backhand-down-the-line drills? Are there more kids out there who could crush it with their non-dominant hand than could develop an absolute top-tier backhand? I don’t know! If Herrera Sanchez (or someone else) makes enough waves, more coaches will consider the possibilities. Then we’ll get more data, and we might be able to sort out whether two forehands is a blind alley, or if it really is the future of tennis.

Surface Speed Convergence, One More Time

I wrote last week about the decline of specialization on the men’s tour. I proposed that we see more good all-around players because, as the overall level improves, there’s less relative value in being a one-dimensional servebot or dirtball grinder.

A few people responded–and I paraphrase, slightly: It’s the surfaces, stupid.

Everybody seems to agree that at some point, let’s say between peak Sampras and peak Djokovic, surface speeds converged. Hard courts got slower, and some grass courts got slower, too. Serve-and-volleying mostly disappeared, and grinding baseline play took over.

The only debate, it seems, is why. Was it a conspiracy to give the fans (well, all the fans except for the ones complaining) what they wanted? Is it the balls? The rackets? The strings?

I’ve always been skeptical of the conspiracy theory. More generally, I have been–and still am–skeptical that playing conditions have changed that much. Just because everybody believes something–even if those people are top-ranked players and well-respected pundits–doesn’t make it true. The historical record shows that styles have changed, but it’s much harder to marshal evidence that the surfaces themselves are meaningfully different than they were 20 or 30 years ago.

A quick review

I’ve looked at this stuff before. Here’s a quick summary:

  • The Mirage of Surface Speed Convergence (2013): I compared ace rates and break rates on hard and clay courts for pairs of players, 1991-2012. I found that the difference between hard courts and clay courts had, if anything, slightly widened, even though the conventional wisdom of convergence was fully in place by then.
  • The Grass is Slowing: Another Look at Surface Speed Convergence (2016): I wish I had named this differently, because I didn’t show that the grass slowed, I showed that rally lengths at Wimbledon (and to some extent at the hard-court slams) were converging with those at Roland Garros. It was my first stab at the problem using Match Charting Project data, which meant it used rally length, instead of ace and break rates. However, it relied on limited data, which meant there were heavy biases in which players it measured.
  • Surface Speed Convergence Revisited (2023): With more MCP data, I worked out a simple model of how much surface affected rally length, and how the effect had changed over time. Now without the selection bias, I showed that in both men’s and women’s tennis, the influence of surface on rally length had shrunk.

Pick your stat

To grossly oversimplify: If you look at ace rate, there’s no evidence of surface convergence. If you look at rally length, there is.

I didn’t want to rely on a 2013 mini-study for the ace-rate conclusion, so I came up with some new fodder.

My surface-speed ratings are based entirely on ace rate. Originally, this is because we don’t have better stats going very far back, while we do have ace rate for all ATP matches since 1991. The MCP has an increasing amount of coverage, but it is not complete, and the ace-based ratings have always seemed to capture surface-speed differences pretty well. There’s some noise, because there are only so many matches per tournament per year. But in general, they give us a pretty good idea of what’s going on.

The downside is that they are indexed to each year’s average. The rating for the 1991 edition of Wimbledon is 1.20, meaning that–controlling for the mix of players–there were 20% more aces than a 1991-average event. This year, Wimbledon’s rating was 1.12: 12% more aces than the 2025 average. But are those averages the same?

That question offers us a neat little experiment. Instead of indexing on a single-year average, why not do two years at a time? The pool of players was almost identical in 1992 as in 1991, so it’s a fair comparison. As it turns out, Wimbledon’s ace-based surface rating went down from 1.20 to 1.06 between 1991 and 1992. That kind of shift often happens due to randomness, but maybe it could be validated by a longer trend. Looking at two years at a time–1991 and 1992 together, 1992 and 1993 together, up to 2024 and 2025 together–allows us to make the same comparisons for the entire tour calendar, for a span of 35 years.

Well, in that span, ace rate has gone up quite a bit. And not just because mediocre servers have been replaced by better ones. On average, the same servers (against the same returners, though the returner effect is much smaller) have upped their ace rate about 2% every year. Not enough to notice as it happens, but enough to move the ATP tour average ace rate from below 7% in 1991 to a bit over 10% today. Some of the difference is due to the tournament mix–a shorter clay calendar, mostly. But I ran the same analysis on a core group of 15 events that have been in the same place since 1991, and the controlled-for-players increase is still 1.6% per year.

What about convergence, taken literally? Have faster events gotten slower, while slower events have sped up?

Nope! The variance between tournament ratings is almost exactly the same in 2024-25 as it was in 1991-92. An example: Back then, Wimbledon’s two-year average was 1.13, while Monte Carlo was 0.58. Over the last two years, Wimbledon’s rating has been 1.14, with Monte Carlo at 0.57.

It’s the strings…

How do we reconcile the evidence that ace rate has gone steadily up, while rally length has also increased?

Setting aside laboratory-type measurements (like CPI/CPR, which we don’t have far enough back, anyway), the purest way to measure court speed is ace rate. A slow court keeps the ball on the ground longer and slows down the rest of its trajectory. Returning is all about reaction time, and ace rate tells us whether returners physically got there or not. That’s why there are, reliably, so many more aces on hard and grass courts than on clay, and on faster hard courts than slower hard courts.

Now, it could be that players have gotten stronger, serve tactics have gotten less predictable, and racket/string technology allows servers to put the ball in the corner more often. All of that is probably true, so the 2%-per-year average likely overstates the change in surface. The ace increase might entirely be attributable to training and tech. But if you want to argue that surfaces have gotten slower, you’ve got an uphill battle to explain how aces have gone so far in the wrong direction.

The rally-length trend is easier to explain. Unlike ace rate, shots-per-point isn’t just about how the ball interacts with the surface. It’s about tactics and spin.

And actually, tactics are themselves largely about spin. And spin, well, that brings us to polyester strings.

Modern topspin is possible largely thanks to polyester strings. The best-known milestone is Gustavo Kuerten’s 1997 French Open title, the first major won with a Luxilon-strung racket. It took a few years for everybody to make the switch, but polyester string was kryptonite for serve-and-volleying. Now it was possible to hit returns that dipped to the server’s feet at the net. All that topspin also made it tougher to move forward. More topspin meant that deep groundstrokes were higher-percentage shots, and that opponents needed to give up even more ground to comfortably handle them.

When I wrote about Lleyton Hewitt a few years ago, I showed how Hewitt forced Roger Federer to basically give up serve-and-volleying. That was 2002-05. If it hadn’t been Hewitt, it would’ve been someone else–or everybody else.

Less serve-and-volleying, safer groundstrokes, fewer net approaches overall … all that adds up to longer rallies. No surface change necessary.

… and the youth

Let me show you the graph from my decline-of-specialization piece again. Generally speaking, it shows how much serve skill is related to return skill. Higher numbers (closer to zero) indicate a closer relationship, or in tennis terms: more all-around players.

Someone on Twitter reasonably asked, what’s up with the peak around 2008-2010? It’s a noisy graph, but a plausible interpretation is that it breaks down into two segments. Up to 2005, most of the data points are between -0.4 and -0.5, with a couple on either side. Since then, the line rarely dips below -0.3. (2013-16 leaves some explaining to do.) Accept this reading, and 2008-10 isn’t a stand-alone peak, it’s the solidification of a new era.

What else was going on in 2008-10? Novak Djokovic won his first slam, and Rafael Nadal established himself as an all-court force. In short, this is when people really started talking about surface speed convergence. Probably not a coincidence.

But why then? Well, in the spring of 1997, the tennis world figured out that polyester strings weren’t just the misguided side-hustle of a bra-strap company. Players with an eye on the future started to switch.

When Guga lifted his trophy, Nadal was 11 years old. Djokovic was 10.

The learning curve

Professional tennis is tough. Players like their gear. They’re used to their gear. It took years for Federer to give up his 90-square-inch frame. Sampras never did abandon his 85-square-incher. When a pro finally does switch, the benefits are hardly instantaneous. It might even mean a temporary step back.

The ultimate advantages go to the tech-natives. For all of Kuerten’s success with Luxilon, he was never going to wring the full benefit of the new technology and the tactics that it implied. If a certain racket/string setup is optimal, the players who do the most with it will be those who built their entire games around it. I don’t know whether the critical age is 8, 11, or 14 (maybe it helped Federer that he was a bit of a late bloomer), but it definitely isn’t 20 or 25.

Check out the rally-length graph (based on slam finals) from my 2016 piece:

Wimbledon went from a low in 1998-2001 to a completely different level by 2006-08. Not a coincidence. The slam-finals graph tells the story of a select few guys, but by the late 2000’s, a whole generation of polyester natives–Djokovic, Nadal, Murray, Nalbandian, Berdych, Ferrer, Monfils–had taken over.

None of this requires the surfaces to change one iota. Maybe fans or tournament directors wanted longer rallies, maybe they didn’t. They were going to get baseline tennis no matter what.

Playing styles converged because topspin-powered strategy works across surfaces in a way that no previous style did. Rallies got longer because the players who tried to shorten them were stranded in the forecourt. They fumbled half-volleys into the net or watched passing shots as they whizzed by. Surfaces ended up as the scapegoat for a new era, but they didn’t cause it.

Aryna Sabalenka, Queen of Clay?

Aryna Sabalenka typically has things more under control, even on clay.

For a while there, it seemed that Aryna Sabalenka and Iga Swiatek would divide the spoils. Sabalenka would dominate on hard courts, and Iga would continue her reign on clay.

At the moment, Aryna is taking it all. She has held the number one ranking for six months now, opening up an astonishing 4,300-point gap on the field. She picked up her third Madrid title on Saturday, straight-setting Coco Gauff shortly after Gauff dealt Swiatek one of her worst-ever clay-court losses. My Elo ratings not only put Sabalenka atop the field, they rank her first on clay. By Elo, at least, the Belarusian will be the favorite at Roland Garros.

Some of this can be explained by Swiatek’s struggles. But Sabalenka has long been ready to seize her chance. Here are her career tour-level results by surface:

Surface     W-L  Win%  Hld%  Brk%  TPW%  
Hard     244-79   73%   75%   37%   53%  
Clay      74-29   72%   74%   38%   53%

This is not the snapshot of a player with a strong surface preference. She has reached ten career clay-court finals, winning three and losing four to Iga.

On the other hand, all three tournament victories (and more final) came in Madrid. Four more of the finals were in Stuttgart. Both events have historically favored bigger hitters: Madrid with its altitude, and Stuttgart with its predictable indoor conditions. Rome and Roland Garros present different challenges.

So, is Sabalenka the new queen of clay, or is her domain limited to the Spanish capital? Is she really the woman to beat in Paris?

Surface sensitivity

Here’s a further breakdown by clay-court event:

Event           W-L   1st%   2nd%    RPW    DR  
Roland Garros  16-7  67.4%  44.5%  47.7%  1.15  
Rome            9-6  65.4%  44.2%  44.3%  1.04  
Madrid         23-4  69.9%  50.6%  44.9%  1.19  
Stuttgart      13-5  69.9%  47.5%  43.2%  1.12

(DR = Dominance Ratio, percentage of return points won divided by serve points lost.)

Madrid stands out as Sabalenka’s playground, and Rome is clearly not her favorite tour stop. But her cumulative stats at the French Open, where she has reached only one semi-final and one other quarter, fit better with the tournaments where she has reached so many finals.

You probably remember Aryna’s tough 6-7, 6-4, 6-4 loss to Mirra Andreeva in last year’s final eight. I had forgotten that it was her fifth straight three-set exit in Paris. Two years ago, it took Karolina Muchova more than three hours to advance to the final. Back in 2020, Sabalenka won more points than Ons Jabeur did in their third-round meeting, yet it was the Tunisian who moved on.

The parade of narrow losses isn’t a case for the Queen-of-Clay title–after all, Iga would’ve won some of those matches in about 56 minutes. It’s merely a reminder that the world number one has often been close. She is playing somewhere near her best-ever tennis right now, so if the improved form carries over to Roland Garros, it’s easy to imagine those close matches finally tipping her way.

Surface insensitivity

Here are some (men’s) surface-speed ratings from the last 52 weeks. Stuttgart is a women’s only event, so I’ve included Hamburg as a rough approximation:

Year  Event          Surface Speed  
2024  Roland Garros           0.66  
2024  Rome                    0.67  
2024  Madrid                  0.82  
2024  Hamburg                 0.89

(I use men’s data for surface speed because the metric is based on ace rate. Men hit more aces, so there’s better data to assess court conditions.)

Tour average, across all surfaces, is 1.0. Speed ratings in the 0.8 to 0.9 range are slow-ish, but they’re more like a slow hard court. For instance, the men’s Masters event in Montreal last year rated a 0.8, almost identical to Madrid. Point being, there is a clear separation between the traditional clay events and the upstarts. It would stand to reason that a big hitter like Sabalenka would struggle more in Rome and Paris.

Despite the trophy count, surface effects don’t show up where I would expect to find them in the stats. The Match Charting Project–thanks to one unhealthily obsessed contributor–has logged almost all of Aryna’s tour-level matches. Based on that data, here are her average rally lengths by event:

Event          Avg Rally  
Roland Garros       3.54  
Rome                3.25  
Madrid              3.30  
Stuttgart           3.14

Sabalenka has defied the slow dirt at the Foro Italico. She has somehow played even shorter points there than in Madrid. We can give some credit to her opponents–she has faced Jelena Ostapenko, Dayana Yastremska, and Danielle Collins there–but even her 2022 match with Iga registered just 3.1 strokes per point.

The same trends–or lack thereof–show up in her serve stats. The next table shows the rate at which Sabalenka’s serves are unreturned, and the percentage of points that she wins with either her serve or her second shot:

Event          Unret%  <=3 W%  
Roland Garros   27.2%   46.9%  
Rome            31.6%   49.0%  
Madrid          30.4%   49.6%  
Stuttgart       36.0%   54.0%

Though Stuttgart is a server's paradise, the gap between Madrid and Rome remains slim. Looking at these numbers, you'd never know that Sabalenka had three titles at one of the events and a 9-6 career record at the other. At the very least, it seems that the slow clay has not prevented the Belarusian from playing her game.

The dropshots

Last year, Sabalenka clay-court game changed. She hit more drop shots than ever, especially in Rome and Paris. My deep dive showed that the tactic was a success across multiple dimensions:

Clay-Sabalenka got the best of both worlds. She won more points by playing the drop, and she won more points because of the tactic’s lingering effect. Perhaps because of her growing reputation as a drop shot queen, the effect has persisted since June, even when she doesn’t go to the well so often.

In theory, dropshots give opponents something to think about, and the positive effect of a good dropshot goes beyond a single point. It's hard enough to handle Sabalenka-level power. Thinking you might have to dash forward makes it even worse. The post-dropshot effect doesn't work for everybody--it is neutral for Ons Jabeur, for example--but it has made Aryna even deadlier.

Expect droppers galore in Rome. Sabalenka unleashed eleven in the Madrid semi-final against Elina Svitolina and another eleven on Coco Gauff in the final. She won 14 of the 22 points. If it works in Madrid, it will almost definitely continue to score points on the more stately surfaces in Rome and Paris.

Sabalenka's new weapon remains a minor tweak, but it has clearly been a positive one. Few women gain so much from dropshotting as she did on slow clay last season.

Coronation?

All of this adds up to Sabalenka being the Roland Garros favorite--mathematically if not emotionally. If she is the new Queen of Clay, it's only by default. Swiatek is a generational talent on the surface: If Iga can play her best, Aryna will be lucky to push the final to three sets.

The case for the world number one, then, is more prosaic. Who could beat her? A resurgent Iga, of course. Andreeva could cause problems again: Perhaps no one else on tour can better neutralize the Sabalenka serve. Ostapenko could blitz her way through, as she did in Stuttgart, but she is even more of a threat to Swiatek than she is to Sabalenka. The luck of the draw is a very real factor when the Latvian is lurking.

The next two weeks in Rome won't overturn any of this, but they could refine the narrative. If Iga coasts to a fourth Italian Open crown, it will be tough to bet against her in Paris. If Aryna comes out on top, she would head to the French as more than just a mathematical favorite. If Ostapenko wins it, well, that would be pretty funny.

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Why Can’t Iga Swiatek Beat Jelena Ostapenko?

Jelena Ostapenko in Stuttgart

Jelena Ostapenko is now 6-0 against Iga Swiatek. Their first meeting doesn’t really count: It was on grass, and Iga was 18. Since then:

One was close, and Swiatek picked up a set in two others. These are (usually) not blowouts. But most of the time Iga faces an opponent outside the top 20, it is a blowout–in the other direction.

Ostapenko is a special case. No one on tour is more aggressive. Her make-or-break style, standing inside the baseline and swinging for winners even on service returns, turns every match into something more like a coin flip. If her aim is off, she can lose to anyone. By the same token, she’s the worst opponent for a top seed to draw in the middle rounds:

Career, Ostapenko has 25 top-ten wins, 21 of them when she was outside the top ten herself. It’s an exaggeration to say that her opponent doesn’t matter, but opponent matters less to the Latvian than to probably anyone else on tour.

Keep it simple

It’s tempting to go straight to the mental explanation: Ostapenko has gotten into Iga’s head, etc. That might explain why the head-to-head is 6-0 instead of 4-2 or 5-1. But there is a more concrete basis for the fact that the underdog keeps coming out ahead.

One of Swiatek’s lesser-known assets is her ability to win serve points. While she doesn’t have the best serve on tour, her opening delivery is quite fast, she rarely misses, and it sets up the rest of her game to finish off points. Over the last 52 weeks, she has held 79% of her service games, more than any other WTA player: Yes, even Aryna Sabalenka.

In their last five meetings, Ostapenko has broken her 31 times.

Against everybody else, Iga gets her share of service winners, and when the ball comes back, her unparalleled baseline skills keep the odds in her favor. Though she can rally with the best of them, she keeps points relatively short. Her serve points average 3.8 strokes, compared to tour average of 4.2.

Against Ostapenko on Saturday, her average serve point lasted 2.8 shots.

Another way to see the Penko effect is to look at the horrible things she does to Swiatek’s top-line serve numbers:

Matches   1stIn  1st W%  2nd W%  
Last 52   64.9%   68.3%   50.3%  
vs Penko  57.8%   51.8%   45.7% 

Among the WTA top 50, Iga ranks in the top dozen for all three of those stats. The Latvian turns her into a wholly ineffectual version of herself. (In my earlier piece about Ostapenko, I wrote that she turns the rest of the tour into Madison Brengle. Even Iga!)

52% of first-serve points won is atrocious. No top-50 player stands below 57%. Sara Sorribes Tormo is the only woman who can compare. 46% isn’t quite so dire: Elise Mertens typically plays at that level, to take one example. But it’s a marked decline from Swiatek’s usual standard.

If you want to make case that Ostapenko has gotten into Iga’s head, the first-serve-in rate is one place to start. There is some tactical basis for taking more first-serve risks against a free swinger. But in this case, they don’t seem to pay off at all. That dreadful 52% win rate on first serve points is the result of hitting them bigger! Iga took more chances on second serves as well. She is typically one of the stingiest women on tour when it comes to double faults, but she piled up eight of them on Saturday.

The clay conundrum

I intended to write a version of this piece back in February, when Ostapenko trounced Swiatek in Doha. Though I missed my chance, I intended to make clear that Iga couldn’t beat her nemesis on hard courts.

And here we are, two months later. Ostapenko leads the clay-court head-to-head, 1-0.

Sort of. Stuttgart’s conditions are hardly those of Rome or Roland Garros. The tournament is held indoors, and the surface doesn’t behave like the crushed brick in Paris. Big servers have traditionally done better in Stuttgart than elsewhere on European clay. Ashleigh Barty won the title in 2021, and both Linsday Davenport and Maria Sharapova three-peated. Iga is a two-time champ as well, but not because the surface is particularly favorable.

Ostapenko scored her latest “upset,” then, on a relatively fast dirt court, one of that doesn’t give Swiatek’s topspin the big bounce it gets on traditional clay. A lower bounce lets the Latvian step in and swing away, much like she does on hard.

On the other hand, Penko is far from hopeless on the slow dirt. She beat Simona Halep to win the 2017 French Open! Worse, from Iga’s perspective, surface speed doesn’t seem to hinder her game style. Here are the rally lengths from the last few “slow clay” Ostapenko performances logged by the Match Charting Project:

Match               Result           RallyLen  
2024 Rome           L vs Sabalenka        2.6  
2023 Roland Garros  L vs Stearns          2.7  
2023 Roland Garros  W vs Martincova       3.4  
2023 Rome           L vs Rybakina         2.9

It’s not the most instructive sample–Ostapenko vs Sabalenka is going to come out under three shots per point on a court made of glue–but it’s clear that the Latvian doesn’t morph into Chris Evert when the conditions change.

At a certain level of aggression, surface just doesn’t matter that much. While Ostapenko doesn’t have an elite serve, she successfully targets the corners, opening up space for easy (for her) winners on the next shot. She takes such breathtaking risks that opponents sometimes are still leaning the wrong way as her shot finds a corner. Slow clay gives players an extra split second to react and respond. A split second is not enough to negate the Ostapenko barrage.

What to do?

Swiatek is one of the best players in the world–indeed, she already ranks among the all-time greats. It can’t really be hopeless.

There are basically two options: Stop Ostapenko from playing her game, or play Ostapenko’s game, but better.

In Stuttgart, Iga seemed to attempt the second. As we’ve seen, she took more chances on both first and second serves, though that tactic didn’t work out. She hit service returns harder, aiming for lines rather than relying on her topspin to give her a Nadal-esque margin of safety on groundstrokes.

At times, it worked. Swiatek hit nearly as many winners as Ostapenko in the second set. When the Latvian lost her way a bit, Iga barely let her win a second-serve point, picking up nearly three out of four. Penko broke her six times, but Swiatek got four of them back.

The play-like-Penko approach should ultimately stop the bleeding. This was the third time the women reached a deciding set; one of these times, the Latvian’s risk-taking will fail to pay off. Nearly everyone else on tour has picked up a win or two against Ostapenko: If Yulia Putintseva can do it, certainly Swiatek can as well.

Iga, though, would prefer something more than just continuing to flip the coin. Is there a way to consistently beat someone with such an outrageously dictatorial game style?

I’d love to give you a galaxy-brain answer here, but I don’t have one. (Wim Fissette hasn’t helped Iga find one either, so I certainly don’t have much of a chance.) At times on Saturday, Swiatek seemed to be trying to wear down the Ostapenko backhand. It is the Latvian’s weaker side, but it is still the source of numerous, often improbable winners. Riskier serving came up empty. The topspin is worthless, though it may have its place in more favorable conditions.

No one on tour owns Ostapenko the way she owns Iga. (Edit: Except Victoria Azarenka–thanks to several of you for pointing that out.) No style or set of tactics–except Vika’s, so far–stops her every time. Sabalenka had won all three meetings with the Latvian, then she managed just five games in yesterday’s Stuttgart final. Sabalenka is one of the few women who can out-hit anybody, but even that level of power isn’t enough to shut out Ostapenko.

The only player reliably able to defeat Penko is herself, and even she hasn’t managed it with Iga standing across the net. She may have another chance in just a few days: The two women are lined up to face each other in the Madrid fourth round. Ostapenko is a mere 5-7 at the event in her career, but she is surely salivating at the chance for another shot at her favorite victim.

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Lorenzo Musetti and the One Hand to Rule Them All

Few backhands are as good as Musetti’s looks

2024 did not go as planned for Lorenzo Musetti. He started the season having fallen out of the top 20, and he didn’t win back-to-back matches until Miami. The skid continued on clay, where he suffered first-round exits in Estoril, Barcelona, Madrid, and Rome.

Somehow he found form on grass, reached the Wimbledon semis, then picked up a bronze medal at the Olympics. That was good enough for a return to the top 20, and with last week’s run to the Monte Carlo final, he’s on the cusp of the top ten. Elo already rates him that highly, and even though he is skipping Barcelona this week, he’s likely to rise from 11th to 10th on the ATP computer next Monday.

Some of the slump could be attributed to distraction: His partner had a baby in the middle of it. (Though that doesn’t explain his decision to play Challengers after losing early in Madrid and Rome.) He’s still just 23, so we could write off the losing streak to the grind of the tour. It takes time to adjust–especially to so much hard-court tennis–and Musetti’s early success might have raised expectations too early.

The oddest part, though, is the surface mix. Last February, I introduced a stat to measure “surface sensitivity“–how much a player’s results were influenced by surface speed. Not just surface type, but the degree to which a server could dominate. At the time, Musetti was the ultimate slow-court specialist. Guys like Rafael Nadal, Alejandro Davidovich Fokina, and Stefanos Tsitsipas showed strong preferences for the most stately surfaces. But Musetti was more extreme than any of them.

Then he went near winless on the dirt, and then he went 12-3 on grass. Predictions are hard, especially about the future.

Yet Musetti’s surface profile is sorting itself out. He excelled at the Paris Olympics, and in the best vindication of my surface sensitivity numbers, he came within a set of scoring his first major title in Monte Carlo. The principality hosts the slowest courts of any major ATP event; it’s no accident that Tsitsipas and Davidovich Fokina have thrived there as well.

Was 2024 a blip, and is he now Lorenzo, king of the dirtballers? Or is there more to the Italian’s game than slow-court success?

The one-hander

Musetti’s signature stroke is his one-handed backhand. He’s now the top-ranked guy with a one-hander, ahead of #16 Tsitsipas and #17 Grigor Dimitrov. Like those two, the Italian is a Federer acolyte.

Almost by definition, the Musetti backhand is lovely to watch. No winner looks better in a highlight reel than a one-handed backhand winner, and he delivers more than his share. Still, we have to ask: Is it any good?

The eye test says yes, but the eye test is not trustworthy when it comes to one-handers. Fortunately, the stats agree. My Backhand Potency (BHP) metric, which balances winners (plus forced errors) against unforced errors, as well as shots that precede one or the other, puts Musetti among the top third of ATP regulars:

The chart shows BHP per 100 backhands for all players with at least 10 charted matches in the last 52 weeks. That includes five guys with one-handed backhands, highlighted in orange. Among those, only Denis Shapovalov is close to the Italian. The other three are in negative territory.

(You can look up other players on the career list. Federer and Stan Wawrinka are both around neutral. Richard Gasquet stands at +2.0, close to Musetti’s current level.)

We don’t have BHP for every match, but there are signs that Musetti’s backhand was particularly effective last week. The stat reached +5.5 in both his second-rounder against Jiri Lehecka and the final against Alcaraz. Whatever the limitations of the one-handed backhand in general, the shot isn’t holding the Italian back.

The best defense…

Topspin backhands, even pretty ones, are best in moderation. Given a choice, just about everyone this side of Alexander Zverev will hit a forehand instead. It’s particularly important to pick the right spots with a one-hander, as the stroke takes more time to prepare. It is also less forgiving when the timing isn’t perfect.

While no single formula applies to everyone, the ideal player will run around some backhands in favor of their forehand, and they’ll skip other backhands in favor of more conservative slices. Here’s how Musetti ranks against his peers over the last year–and the career numbers of a few all-time greats–as measured by forehands-per-groundstroke and slices-per-backhand:

Player              FH/GS  BH Slice%  
Grigor Dimitrov     48.5%      55.4%  
Lorenzo Musetti     50.5%      39.4%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas  52.4%      22.3%  
Mpetshi Perricard   55.1%      32.4%  
Denis Shapovalov    56.8%      32.4%  

Career:                               
Roger Federer       48.8%      37.0%  
Richard Gasquet     45.0%      22.9%  
Stan Wawrinka       49.9%      31.3% 

The Federer number reminds us that FH/GS isn’t about how often a player would prefer to hit a forehand. Everybody targets the backhand, and the worse your backhand, the more they take aim. So Fed’s 48.8% is what results when far more than half of shots were aimed at that side. He slipped around them for as many forehands as he could justify.

The Italian’s numbers are surprisingly close to both Fed’s and Wawrinka’s. He manages to hit a few more forehands–perhaps because the data we have for him is skewed a bit toward clay–and he slices more than Roger did. That’s a clue as to why Musetti can hold his own on grass: He’s right at home prolonging points with slice backhands.

Forehand-finding is also a clue as to why Lorenzo’s fortunes are on the uptick. Here’s a selection of his FH/GS rate in recent notable clay-court matches:

Match                 Result          FH/GS  
2025 Monte Carlo F    L vs Alcaraz    62.0%  
2025 Monte Carlo R32  W vs Lehecka    56.0%  
2024 Olympics BR      W vs FAA        49.2%  
2024 Olympics SF      L vs Djokovic   44.9%  
2024 Olympics QF      W vs Zverev     44.8%  
2024 Umag F           L vs Cerundolo  41.8%

The Alcaraz match is a tough one to parse, because the stats incorporate Musetti’s attempt to play it out with an injury. But though he lost, he was right there with the Spaniard for the first ten or eleven games. He only needed to hit two plus-one backhands in the entire first set.

However we handle the Monte Carlo final, it should be clear by now that there’s a big difference between 45% and 55% forehands. At 45%, opponents are trying to exploit that wing and the player is happy to hit backhands, a la Zverev or Daniil Medvedev. The Italian may finally be taking a page from the playbooks of compatriots Matteo Berrettini and Lorenzo Sonego, saving his backhand for when he really needs it.

Going hard?

If Musetti is going to make a permanent home in the top ten, he’ll need more hard-court wins. He could get by with an annual romp through clay season, especially if he continues to rack up wins on grass. But the latter seems like a big ask, and there just aren’t enough events on dirt these days for a single-surface guy to find stardom.

The Italian does have a hard-court title: Naples in 2022, where he beat Berrettini in not-so-fast conditions. He added a final last year on speedy courts in Chengdu; the caveat there is that he didn’t face a single top-40 opponent.

Bigger picture: Musetti is 3-11 against top-tenners on the surface, and those three wins don’t inspire confidence. He knocked out a passive Zverev in Vienna last year, beat Casper Ruud in Paris, and got past Diego Schwartzman back in 2021. In those 14 matches, he won fewer than 57% of service points. None of the wins were straight-setters, and all of the losses were.

His game, let’s face it, was made for clay. He’s one of the most passive players on tour. Here are the tour’s least aggressive players–by rally aggression score, a measure of how often the player ends points for good or bad, scaled between -100 and +100–over the last 52 weeks, minimum ten charted matches:

Player            RallyAgg  
Daniil Medvedev        -93  
T M Etcheverry         -79  
Alex de Minaur         -73  
Lorenzo Musetti        -58  
Sebastian Baez         -53  
Rafael Nadal           -53  
Alexander Zverev       -47  
Gael Monfils           -46  
Novak Djokovic         -46  
Marcos Giron           -45

Musetti is less aggressive than Zverev. Less aggressive than Sebastian Baez. He hasn’t scored above average on this metric for a single non-grass match in two years.

In other words: He lets the game come to him, and alas… it does.

The tour’s most common surface may be the achilles heel of the one-handed backhand. It is of course possible to win on hard with a one-hander, as Federer showed us for the better part of two decades. To grossly oversimplify, he did it by hiding that backhand. Tstisipas’s recent resurgence in Dubai came from maxing out the aggression on that wing.

You can win on hard courts with passive tennis–go Medvedev!–or you can win on hard courts with a well-shielded one-hander. But it is increasingly clear that you can’t do both. Musetti has proven his potential on both of the game’s natural surfaces, showing off the value of both topspin and slice groundstrokes to do so. That’s enough to make him a top-tenner–barely. To win on hard courts, he will need more Federer-esque tactics to go with his Roger-inspired backhand.

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What Do We Make of Sofia Kenin These Days?

Sofia Kenin in her run to the Tokyo final last year

Is Sofia Kenin back? Was she ever gone? Was she ever there in the first place? Has any player so persistently defied categorization?

Big questions aside, Kenin is suddenly more relevant than she has been in at least 18 months. This time last year, she was suffering through a nine-match losing streak. She would add another bad patch in the summer and fall out of the top 150 before reaching last October’s Tokyo final. Since then, she has lost only one first-round match (when she drew Coco Gauff in Melbourne) and made another 500-level final in Charleston. Kenin had set point on Sunday to force Jessica Pegula into a third set before the veteran summoned her mysterious forces and finished the job.

This is all a far cry from 2020, when the American bracketed the pandemic pause by winning the Australian Open and reaching the French final. But her Charleston showing moves her ranking back up to 34, the highest it has been since late 2023. Her Elo rating is even better, good for 25th on tour.

What is working again for Sonya? Is she back in the top 40 to stay?

Oh, those groundstrokes

When the Kenin game is clicking, it is a joy to watch. She is one of the most versatile players on tour, with the ability and willingness to deploy just about every shot in the book. She tried ten drop shots in the Charleston final against Pegula and sent both forehand and backhand slices across the net. I’ve even seen her win points with moonballs.

In the 2020s WTA, though, versatility can only be the icing, not the cake. Fortunately for the 26-year-old, both her forehand and backhand are among the game’s best. By my Forehand Potency (FHP) metric, she ranks 16th on tour over the last 52 weeks, in between the fearsome weapons of Iga Swiatek and Amanda Anisimova. Her backhand is the signature shot, and it rates even better, coming in 9th.

Combined, she gets more value from her groundstrokes than almost anyone else. Here is the top ten, based on charted matches since this time last year:

Player                 FHP/100  BHP/100  Combined  
Jelena Ostapenko          18.7     11.0      29.7  
Amanda Anisimova           9.2     14.1      23.3  
Aryna Sabalenka           13.0      9.3      22.3  
Ekaterina Alexandrova     13.6      8.5      22.1  
Danielle Collins          12.7      9.0      21.7  
Linda Noskova             14.1      7.4      21.5  
Iga Swiatek               10.0      9.0      19.0  
Madison Keys              11.3      7.5      18.8  
Sofia Kenin                9.4      7.8      17.2  
Jessica Pegula             8.3      8.0      16.3

For all the heavy hitters on that list, Kenin is more like Pegula than the rest. She attempts to dictate with placement, not power. Give her an opening, and she’ll rarely squander it. She’ll miss as much as some of these sluggers, but that’s because she relentlessly aims for the lines. The overall tally tilts in her favor.

She falters when she doesn’t have enough space to work with. Pegula, boasting perhaps the best anticipation of anyone on tour, consistently cut down the angles Kenin had to work with on Sunday. Sonya doesn’t have the patience to wait for the next opportunity, so she aimed for narrower and narrower spaces. The result, predictably, was a giant pile of unforced errors. She committed 33 of them off the ground–nearly one in four points.

Speaking of patience: That’s one category where she resembles the power hitters on that last list. Her average point in the past year has averaged just 3.4 shots, the same as Madison Keys and Ekaterina Alexandrova, fewer than Clara Tauson or Donna Vekic. A bit of a paradox is emerging here: Kenin has an impressive range of all-court and defensive skills, but she doesn’t play like it.

Is she a… servebot?

The American doesn’t seem like a weak returner. Aggressive, yes. Too aggressive, maybe. But any woman with such an effective backhand should be able to post decent numbers against the serve.

Yet: It is a constant struggle to break serve. The typical player in the WTA top 50 breaks 37% of the time. Swiatek grades out at 45.5%, and several more women top 42%. Pegula stands at 38.5%. Kenin, at 30.3%, ranks 48th of 50. Here are her peers at the wrong end of the list:

Player                Break%  
Lulu Sun               19.7%  
Linda Noskova          28.4%  
Sofia Kenin            30.3%  
Katie Boulter          30.8%  
Clara Tauson           31.2%  
Magda Linette          31.5%  
Xin Yu Wang            32.0%  
Donna Vekic            32.6%  
Ekaterina Alexandrova  32.9%  
Barbora Krejcikova     33.1%

Judging by some of these names, Kenin might be able to sneak into the top 20 with this return game. Vekic is 20th on the WTA points table. Tauson is 21st.

If there’s one characteristic that ties many of these players together, it is that their results run hot and cold. Krejcikova has won two slams but often struggled to get past early rounds. Noskova is a nightmare for Iga but manageable for others. Low break rates mean that the margins will always be narrow: Good for upsets and the occasional hot streak, bad for any semblance of consistency.

Kenin essentially takes the racket out of her own hands. Of players with at least ten matches in the charting database over the last year, only Danielle Collins puts fewer returns in play:

Player                  RiP%  RiP W%  
Danielle Collins       61.9%   55.7%  
Sofia Kenin            62.5%   54.0%  
Ekaterina Alexandrova  63.2%   58.3%  
Amanda Anisimova       64.3%   58.9%  
Alycia Parks           65.9%   59.6%  
Linda Noskova          66.4%   53.9%  
Liudmila Samsonova     66.9%   56.6%  
Barbora Krejcikova     67.3%   53.9%  
Bianca Andreescu       67.4%   54.4%  
Madison Keys           68.1%   57.6% 

A lot of these names are starting to look familiar. As with the FHP/BHP lists, Kenin shares space with some of the game’s biggest hitters, even if I wouldn’t think of her that way. Maybe she disagrees: She certainly takes chances on return as if she does.

Yet the results aren’t there. The rightmost column, winning percentage on returns in play, shows that Kenin trails Collins, Alexandrova, Anisimova, and most of the rest by a healthy margin. She is roughly equal to Noskova and Krejcikova, though the Czechs get more balls back to start with. It’s fine to win 54% of points if the denominator is big enough–to take one example of many, Paula Badosa stands at 52%–but Sonya loses too many points without forcing the server to hit even one more ball.

As for the question in my subhead: No, Kenin isn’t really a servebot. Her serve itself ranks in the middle of the pack. But alas, her return stats are better suited to someone with a much more powerful first strike.

Same as the old Kenin?

It is tempting to conclude that Sonya’s 2020 was a remarkable streak of luck. She won the Australian Open after sneaking past Ashleigh Barty in the semi-final, winning fewer than 51% of points. She picked up the Lyon title a month later with four three-setters and five tiebreaks. She reached the Covid Roland Garros final even though Samsonova won more points than she did in their first-round encounter.

On the other hand, Kenin is a fundamentally different player than she was five years ago. One indicator is her now-languishing break rate:

Year  Break%  
2018   34.0%  
2019   34.0%  
2020   34.7%  
2021   33.9%  
2022   23.3%  
2023   31.5%  
2024   28.3%  
2025   30.9%

34% or 35% isn’t great, but it’s worlds apart from where she is now. Rybakina, while off her own peak lately, gets by with just 36%.

Back then, the American wasn’t so quick to pull the trigger. Based on the 17 matches we have in the charting database, her average point in 2020 lasted 4.1 strokes, another sharp contrast to her 3.4 of the last 52 weeks. 4.1 is at or above tour average, equal to Coco Gauff’s usual mark.

A big part of the difference is that she put more returns in play. In those 2020 matches, she got 71.7% of serves back, nearly ten percentage points higher than her current rate. She also won more of those points:

Span      RiP%  RiP W%  
2020     71.7%   55.0%  
Last 52  62.5%   54.0%

By just about every metric I have, Kenin is more aggressive now than she was at her best, and the strategy isn’t paying off. Perhaps she feels that she has to hit harder–or at least adopt tactics that mimic her more powerful peers–to keep up. Maybe she has lost a bit of quickness: Ankle and foot injuries sidelined her for much of 2022.

2020-era Sonya, then, is not back. Her form over the last six months suggests she might have landed on something that will work, if not anywhere near her peak level. The stats keep telling us she’s just like Alexandrova, and the risk-taking Russian has spent years in the top 30, picking up a title every year or so and making trouble for her higher-ranked peers. Kenin is on track to do the same.

Yet unlike Alexandrova, Anisimova, and the rest, Kenin is a former slam champ, with memories of an entirely different level of tennis. Performances like Tokyo and Charleston suggest she is getting closer to recapturing that magic. If she starts getting more serves back, then it’s time for the rest of the tour to worry.

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